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TORTURE
MARCY STRAUSS*
“There have been, and are now, certain foreign na-
tions . . . which convict individuals with testimony ob-
tained by police organizations possessed of unrestrained
power to seize persons . . . hold them in secret custody
and wring from them confessions by physical or mental
torture.  So long as the Constitution remains the basic law
of this Republic, America will not have that kind of
government.”1
INTRODUCTION
The events of September 11, 2001 changed so many things and
so many lives in the United States.2  It also affected our discourse
about interrogation and torture.3  Within days of realizing that a
tight-lipped, possible co-conspirator to the attacks in New York and
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School. J.D. 1981 Georgetown University Law
Center; B.S. 1978 Northwestern University.  I wish to thank Erwin Chemerinsky for
reading and critiquing this manuscript, and Jeff Atik for taking the time to share his
knowledge about international law.  I am also grateful for the work of my research
assistants, Darren Brenner and Elaine Hsu.
1. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 155 (1944).
2. For a discussion of the various ways in which September 11, 2001 affected the
psyche of Americans, see Karen Peterson, The Family Is Enough, USA TODAY, Dec. 27,
2001, at 1D (Americans are dealing with own emotional ground zero); Marco R. delle
Cava, Where Do We Go From Here? USA TODAY, Dec. 17, 2001, at 1D (discussing change in
six people’s lives after Sept. 11); see also David Cole, Lawyers Keep Out, NATION, Apr. 21,
2003, at 4. (“September 11 changed everything.”).  That the events of September 11
would affect jurisprudence is not surprising.  It would not be the first time that funda-
mental world events affected our nation’s thinking about criminal procedure.  Many
believe that the Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence, and particularly its view of
voluntary confessions, was heavily influenced by the experience in World War II and
especially the Nazi war crimes in Nuremberg. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, & GEORGE THOMAS
III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES, 547-48 (1999).
3. As Alan Dershowitz noted, “the events of September 11 require us to imagine
the unimaginable, and think the unthinkable.” Scott Martinelle, Terror Probe May Use
Truth Serum, THE RECORD, Nov. 8, 2001, at 20; see also Alan Dershowitz, Rethink Every-
thing, JD JUNGLE, Feb/Mar. 2002, at 48, 52 (“the events of September 11 . . . should
make all of us rethink even our most fundamental beliefs about the law . . . The events
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202 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
Washington was in custody, and after detaining other potential sus-
pects who were not forthcoming with information,4 FBI agents
floated in the press the idea of re-introducing torture or other un-
conventional methods of questioning.5  After all, the nineteen hi-
sidered . . . [including leading] some people to advocate such extreme measures as
truth serum and even torture.”).
Others have expressed a similar sentiment.  “In this autumn of anger, even a liberal
can find his thoughts turning to . . . torture.”  Jonathan Alter, Time To Think About
Torture, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 5, 2001, at 45; Alexander Cockburn, The Wide World of Torture,
NATION Nov. 26, 2001, Vol. 273 at 10 (calling torture “this week’s hot topic.”); see also
Robert Weisberg, “The fact that we’re even having this conversation [about torture]
shows how much things have changed since Sept. 11” quoted in Vick Haddock, The Un-
speakable: To Get At The Truth, Is Torture or Coercion Ever Justified? SAN. FRAN. CHRONICLE,
Nov. 18, 2001, at D1.
A poll conducted after 9/11 suggested that one third of Americans favor the use of
torture on terrorist suspects.  Transcript, “Sixty Minutes” 34 BURRELL’S INFORMATION
SERVICE PUBLISHING, at 7 (Jan. 20, 2002).  The mere existence of such a poll suggests a
major shift in thinking among the public.
Interestingly, pre-September 11 there was one person who was pondering the ques-
tion of torture and terrorists: a German law professor wrote an article in anticipation of
the possibility of terrorists with weapons of mass destruction.  Professor Brugger posed
the question: is torture ever justified?  In concluding yes, Brugger acknowledged that
he was, to his knowledge, the first German law professor in the last 50 years to advocate
use of torture even in exceptional circumstances.  Winfried Brugger, May Government
Ever Use Torture?  Two Responses From German Law, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 661, 677 (2000).
Other law professors were pondering similar issues with respect to Israeli law. See arti-
cles compiled in 23 ISR. L. REV. 1 (1989).
4. Haddock, supra note 3, at D1.  Haddock discusses the four suspects — Zacarias
Moussaoui, (who was detained in August, 2001 on immigration charges after he acted
suspiciously at a flight school in Minnesota, and then held as a material witness), Mo-
hammed Azmath and Ayub Ali Kan (who were traveling with fake passports when they
were arrested on an Amtrak train with box cutters, hair dye and $5,000 cash), and Nabil
Almarabh, a former Boston cab driver suspected of having links to bin Laden.  “FBI
agents are said to have offered the traditional inducements to them — reduced prison
sentences, money, relocation to the United States and new IDs for themselves and their
families — if they cooperate . . . But inducements haven’t worked this time.” Id.
Except for Moussaoiu, all of the others have been released without any charges
being filed against them.  Moussaoui was indicted on six criminal charges, including
committing terrorist acts.  Four of the charges carry a penalty of death.  Dan Eggen &
Brooke A. Masters, U.S. Indicts Suspect in September 11 Attacks, WASH. POST, Dec.12, 2001,
at A1.  The Government was apparently hoping that the threat of execution would
make Moussaoui cooperate, a hope thus far unrealized. Id.  Moussaoui pled guilty in
July 2002, later withdrawing that plea.  John Riley, Change of Heart, NEWSDAY, July 26,
2002, at A05.  He is currently awaiting trial.
5. Walter Pincus, Silence of 4 Terror Probe Suspects Poses Dilemma For FBI, WASHING-
TON POST, Oct. 21, 2001, at A6 (“FBI and Justice Department investigators are increas-
ingly frustrated by the silence of jailed suspected associates of Osama Bin Laden’s al
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jackers belonged to a sophisticated organization, and any
accomplices likely were trained to resist traditional interrogation
techniques and “ploys” to garner information during interroga-
tion.6  Furthermore, there was real fear that the attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon were just the beginning of a
have to be cast aside if they are to extract information about the September 11 attacks
and terrorist plans.”). See Haddock, supra note 3 (frustration with failed interrogation
of detainees led unnamed FBI agent to leak to Washington Post story about possible
need for truth serum or extradition to country less squeamish about rough
interrogation).
A few months later, such calls for innovative interrogation techniques were heard
again when Richard Reid, the so called “shoe bomber” who tried to blow up an Ameri-
can Airlines jet from Paris to Miami by igniting a bomb in his shoe, was arrested. See
Simon Crerar, Giving the Lie to Truth Drugs, TIMES NEWSPAPERS LTD., Jan. 6, 2002
(“Hardline opinion in America is calling for controversial truth drugs to be given to the
suspected “shoe bomber,” Richard Reid.”).
Similar cries for additional interrogation techniques were heard when Abu
Zabaydah, a top lieutenant to Osama bin Laden, was captured.  Noting that al Qaeda
members are trained to resist normal interrogation, use of truth serum or other “coer-
cive” techniques were urged in order to find out about future possible attacks being
planned by the group. See Ann Scott Tyson, U.S. Task: Get Inside Head of Captured bin
Laden Aide, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Apr. 4, 2002, at 1.  Ironically, Zubaydah has
apparently been cooperating, for reasons unknown.  Michael Kirkland, Padillo Not Coop-
erating with U.S., UPI INTERNATIONAL, June 12, 2002.  The quality of his information
remains uncertain. Id.
Most recently, Pakistan captured Ramzi bin al-Shibh, a 30 year-old Yemeni who
most believe was integrally involved in the September 11 attacks.  Michael Elliott, Reel-
ing Them In, TIME, Sept. 23, 2002, at 28.  Bin al-Shibh too is cooperating with authori-
ties.  Johanna McGeary & Douglas Waller, Why Can’t We Find Bin Laden? TIME, Nov. 24,
2002 at 28.
Despite such pressure, the military has consistently denied that it has any plans to
use truth serum or other drugs during the interrogations of Taliban and al Qaeda pris-
oners at Guantanamo Bay.  Stewart M. Powell, Truth Serum Urged for Detainees, MILWAU-
KEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Apr. 28, 2002, at 16A. But see Yvonne Ridley, Al Qaeda Terrorists
Could be Used as CIA Guinea Pigs: Truth Drug Threat to Cuba Prisoners, SUNDAY EXPRESS,
Jan. 27, 2002, at 27 (claiming that CIA sources said that truth serum and other methods
will be used if necessary at “Camp X-ray.”).
6. An al Qaeda training manual in evidence at the embassy bombing trials lists 26
torture methods, including “placing drugs and narcotics in the brother’s food to
weaken his will power” and several methods of psychological torture.  Frank J. Murray,
Using Truth Serum an Option in Probes, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2001 at A1.
Persons committed to jihad and to undertaking suicide attacks might not be signifi-
cantly coerced by threats of death. See Wolf Blitzer Reports, Statement of  Peter Bergen (CNN
television broadcast, April 1, 2002) (transcript). (“I think it’s very unlikely that
[Zubayday] will say anything . . . Because in past when al Qaeda members have been
interrogated, they have tended to keep quiet unless they’re facing very long prison
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reign of terrorist activity in the United States.  Given the potential
for catastrophic destruction, what should be the limits when ques-
tioning individuals who might be knowledgeable about such future
attacks?
As the United States took into custody hundreds of individuals
in Afghanistan and detained hundreds more in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba7 and elsewhere,8 legal pundits and other experts began to
7. As of December, 2002, there are approximately 600 persons from 40 different
nations detained in Guantanamo Bay.  Henry Weinstein, Prisoners May Face ‘Legal Black
Hole,’ L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2002, at A1.  For the first time, on October 28, 2002, the
United States military authorities released four prisoners from Guantanamo Bay after
deciding that they have no value for U.S. intelligence and are not a terrorist threat.
U.S. Releases 4 From Guantanamo Prison, L.A TIMES, Oct. 29, 2002, at A11.  There are
several pending lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the detentions in Cuba. See
infra note 232.
8. On the one-year anniversary of September 11, it was reported that officials in
98 countries had detained more than 2700 al Qaeda or allied terrorist suspects.
Amanda Bower, More Arrests, New Threats in the Fight Against Terror, TIME, September 9,
2002 at 16.  As of the time this article was written, the precise number of citizens ar-
rested or detained in the United States is unclear, since the government has been reti-
cent to release information.  It appears that over 1100 were arrested or detained on
immigration or other charges shortly after September 11.  Amy Goldstein, A Deliberate
Strategy of Disruption; Massive, Secretive Detention Effort Aimed Mainly at Preventing More Ter-
ror, WASHINGTON POST, Nov 5, 2001, at A1.  About half of those have been released.
Neil Lewis & Don Van Natta, Jr, A Nation Challenged: The Investigation: Ashcroft Offers
Accounting of 641 Charged, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2001, at A1.  Obviously, suspects
continue to be arrested, albeit at a slower pace.  In September 2002, for example, 5 U.S.
citizens of Yemeni descent were arrested in upstate New York and charged, among
other things, with having received training at an al Qaeda training camp in Afghani-
stan.  Josh Meyer & Thomas Mulligan, The Hunt for al Qaeda, L.A. TIMES, September 15,
2002, at A1.
Potential terrorists with involvement in the September 11 attacks or with ties to al
Qaeda are being held around the world.  And some of these detainees are supposedly
providing valuable information after being interrogated.  What is not clear are the pre-
cise interrogation tactics used to obtain this valuable information.  For example, on
June 5, 2002, Indonesian authorities arrested Omar al-Faruq, a top bin Laden official in
Southeast Asia, and turned him over to a U.S. held air base in Bagram, Afghanistan.
According to secret CIA documents and intelligence reports obtained by Time Maga-
zine, al-Faruq was not cooperative at first.  After three months of “psychological interro-
gation tactics, including isolation and sleep deprivation, he finally broke down and told
of several planned attacks to take place on or near the first anniversary of the Septem-
ber 11th attacks. See Romesh Ratnesar, Confessions of an Al-Qaeda Terrorist, TIME, Sept.
23, 2002, at 37.
These intelligence reports were at least partly responsible for the United States
increasing the terror alert code to “orange” from “yellow” on September 10, 2002.  Toni
Locy & John Diamond, Alert Follows al Qaeda Break, USA TODAY, Sept. 11, 2002 at 3A.
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2003] TORTURE 205
question whether torture was legal in the United States, and, if not,
whether it should be.9  Moreover, the specter of weapons of mass
destruction being employed in the United States raised the ante,
and led many to speculate whether torture would be justified to
prevent mass casualties.10  In this “ticking bomb” scenario, torture
would be allowed if there were significant evidence that loss of life
was imminent and the only way to obtain the necessary information
to prevent such a tragedy would be through the use of extreme
measures, including torture.  Figuring most prominently in this de-
bate was Harvard Law School professor Alan Dershowitz, who seem-
ingly advocated the use of torture in certain limited
circumstances,11 a surprising stance for a civil libertarian.
decreased again to yellow on September 24, 2002. See Josh Meyer, US Downgrades Terror
Alert Level from ‘Orange’ to ‘Yellow’, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2002, at 14.  It is unknown, of
course, whether al-Faruq was lying, mistaken, or whether any attacks were simply pre-
vented or delayed by law enforcement efforts.
9. See, e.g., CNN Transcripts, Target Terrorism: Forcing Suspects to Talk, October 25,
2001, available at http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0110/25/cf.oohtml; CNN.com
Transcripts, CNN the Point with Greta Van Susteren, Tracking the Terrorists, October 26,
2001, available at http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0110/26/tpt.00html; MSNBC
Transcripts, Alan Keyes Is Making Sense, February 4, 2002, available at http:/www.msnbc.
com/news/70024.asp (all on file with author); see also Use of Truth Serum Urged, CHI.
TRIBUNE, Apr. 26, 2002, at 2 (William Webster, a former director of the CIA and FBI
urged the Pentagon to administer truth serum drugs — but not use torture — in ques-
tioning defiant Taliban and al Qaeda prisoners).
Torture-related issues have also been thrust into the forefront of popular culture.
Two recent television shows introduced, albeit briefly, the topic of torture. See, e.g., 24
Hours: “Day One,” (Fox television broadcast, 2002) (showing man tortured in South
Korea by South Koreans; American waiting in next room to get the information, which
was that a nuclear device had been planted in Los Angeles and was scheduled to ex-
plode that day); Law and Order: Criminal Intent: “The Pilgrim,”(NBC television broadcast,
2002) (detective suggests using truth serum on captured would-be suicide bomber to
reveal where his partner was; ultimately, “persuasive” psychological interrogation tactics
by main star, a New York detective, and traditional police investigative techniques lead
police to capture second bomber in time); CSI Miami: “A Horrible Mind,”  (CBS televi-
sion broadcast, 2002) (professor who lectured on and indulged in torture is found tor-
tured; culprit turns out to be student).  Torture also has featured prominently in a new
James Bond film, DIE ANOTHER DAY (MGM, 2002).  In that film James Bond, a British
secret agent, is captured in North Korea, and tortured over an 18-month period before
being released.  Although not totally clear, Bond apparently never revealed any secrets
during his interrogations.  The torture scenes, though shown in brief clips and out of
focus, were nonetheless chilling to watch.
10. See supra notes 2, 3, and 5, and accompanying text.
11. Alan M. Dershowitz, Can There Ever Be More Torturous Road to Justice? THE HAM-
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According to post September 11th discourse about torture, the
interest of investigators has shifted from obtaining viable evidence
for prosecution to obtaining credible information for preventing
future acts of terrorism.12  Numerous experts have suggested that
“coercive” techniques of interrogation that would normally not be
considered should be pursued in the war on terrorism.13  This shift
is significant because American law arguably allows government of-
ficials greater latitude to use coercive tactics, including torture, in
questioning suspects so long as the purpose of the investigation is
to deter or detect the next terrorist attack, rather than obtain evi-
dence for a criminal trial.14
were to arise, our law enforcement authorities would torture.  The real debate is
whether such torture should take place outside of our legal system or within it.  The
answer to this seems clear:  If we are to have torture, it should be authorized by the
law.”).  In his recently published book, Dershowitz argues for a torture warrant, where
judges weigh the competing claims and decide whether a suspect should be tortured.
ALAN DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RESPONDING
TO THE CHALLENGE (2002).
12. See, e.g., comments of Professor Dershowitz, suggesting the use of torture war-
rants, and allowing the fruits of such interrogation only for investigative purposes and
not to convict the detainee, quoted in Alter, supra note 3; see also Haddock, supra note 3
(“Most legal experts say that if investigators use truth serum or other coercive methods,
the goal becomes prevention, not prosecution.”).
13. See Use of Truth Serum Urged, CHI. TRIBUNE, Apr. 26, 2002 (William Webster,
former director of the CIA and the FBI, and a former judge urged the Pentagon to
administer truth serum to Taliban and al Qaeda prisoners if necessary, so long as the
information is used for the protection of the country and not to prosecute).  Jed Bab-
bin, former deputy undersecretary of defense, and an attorney, agreed with Webster.
See Ann Tyson, U.S. Task: Get Inside Head of Captured bin Laden Aide, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Apr. 4, 2002.
Drawing a distinction between evidence obtained for public safety purposes and
for prosecution purposes is not a new phenomenon.  In 1985, no less a civil libertarian
than Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote in a dissent: “ the public’s safety can be perfectly
well protected without abridging the Fifth Amendment . . . If a bomb is about to ex-
plode or the public is otherwise imminently imperiled, the police are free to interro-
gate suspects without advising them of their constitutional rights . . . If trickery is
necessary to protect the public, then the police may trick a suspect into confession . . .
All the Fifth Amendment forbids is the introduction of coerced statements at trial.”
New York. v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
14. Typical are the comments made by Jeffrey Toobin: “ I think we’re beginning
to see sort of the beginnings of two legal systems that are at work here . . . The Justice
Department is really changing its orientation in some ways toward preventing crime.
They don’t care as much about prosecutions anymore.  They want to prevent terrorism
and they’re going to do whatever it takes.  And that may include sodium pentathol or
even harsher measures, and they just don’t care about whether it’s used in court.”
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Thus, the time is ripe for a more academic analysis of whether
the United States should ever engage in torture during interroga-
tions of suspected terrorists.  What are the current constitutional
restraints on interrogation, and do they permit coercive tactics in
any circumstance?  Should some leeway for “truth serum” or even
more drastic measures be permitted?  Moreover, even if torture
could be constitutionally and philosophically justified, would such
measures be effective?  This article attempts to provide answers to
these questions, or at least suggest areas for future, scholarly
consideration.
In Section I, I provide a brief working definition of torture.  In
Section II, I examine the constitutional restraints on interrogation
tactics and question whether the law varies if the evidence obtained
is introduced at trial.  I conclude that the due process clause and
the privilege against self-incrimination place significant restraints
on the use of torture in order to obtain evidence to be used against
the suspect in a criminal trial.  Whether torture undertaken solely
to obtain information to prevent an imminent terrorist attack vio-
lates the Constitution, however, is not as clear.  Indeed, last term in
Chavez v. Martinez, the Supreme Court addressed whether the due
process clause and the privilege against self-incrimination protect a
suspect during interrogation without regard to the admissibility of
any incriminating evidence.15  The decision, however, generated six
separate opinions with no clear majority, and thus the case provides
little guidance.  I also conclude that international law is not a signif-
icant legal barrier to the use of torture in the United States even
though treaties to which the United States is a signatory condemn
torture without exception.
In Section III, I consider the moral and philosophical argu-
ments for and against torture.  I also consider the practical effec-
tiveness of allowing the government limited ability to use
extraordinary means of interrogation in extremely narrow circum-
stances.  These arguments are important because the consideration
of whether torture violates a person’s substantive due process rights
94/http//www.cnn.com/Cn. . ./blitzer.report/2002/04/04.29.ht (copy on file with
author).
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turns in part on the state’s compelling need to engage in such
activity.
In Section IV, I conclude that official state sanctioning of tor-
ture is never justified.  Given the minimal likelihood of success
from torture, the existence of alternative investigative techniques,
the harm to society when torture is utilized, and most importantly,
the danger that the government will resort to torture in ever in-
creasing circumstances, the United States should categorically re-
ject the use of torture as an interrogation tactic.
I. DEFINING TORTURE
When discussed in the media torture is rarely defined.16
Rather, a wide variety of practices are almost casually referred to as
“torture.”17  Moreover, no decision in American case law provides
16. After reviewing transcripts of news shows which discussed torture, I found it
very interesting that no one during any of the shows offered any definition of torture.
It was treated as though everyone had the same definition in mind.  But clearly we
don’t.  Torture is one of those words that even in everyday parlance have a variety of
meanings.  It is, on the one hand, acknowledged as one of the most egregious behavior
undertaken by people.  Yet, on the other hand, we use the term to refer to a variety of
clearly less abusive behavior.  For example, I’ve often heard a person say to another:
“you’re torturing me,” when that other person won’t stop making them laugh.  Kids
lament that their parents are “torturing” them when they ground them, or make them
meet curfew.  Parents complain that a baby who wakes all night long is “torturing
them.”  Taking a particularly boring class is often referred to as “torture” by many
students.
17. See EDWARD PETERS, TORTURE 1-2 (1985) (discussing definition of torture over
time, and concluding:  “From the seventeenth century on, the purely legal definition of
torture was slowly displaced by a moral definition; from the nineteenth century the
moral definition of torture has been supplanted largely by a sentimental definition,
until ‘torture’ may finally mean whatever one wishes it to mean. . ..”)
In an interesting “60 Minutes” episode on torture, Mike Wallace was discussing
with a retired FBI agent the “torture” by Philippine authorities of a prisoner in the
Philippines; the information obtained from the man was used to convict him in the
United States.  Wallace remarks that [the Philippine authorities] tortured him.  You
know it . . .  The ex-FBI agent merely said:  “they did use certain techniques in-in elicit-
ing information.  That is correct.”  Neither put on the table any definition of torture —
it was as though they were speaking in code. See 60 Minutes Transcripts, supra note 3.
Judge Richard Posner recently wrote that certain practices often called torture —
truth serum, sleep deprivation, bright lights — are more aptly called coercion, not tor-
ture, but does not define the difference.  Richard Posner, The Best Offense, NEW REPUB-
LIC, Sept. 2, 2002 (book review); see also, Michael Moore, Torture and the Balance of Evils,
23 ISR. L. REV. 280 (1989), where Professor Moore writes that “there is world of differ-
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an all-encompassing definition of torture; at best the courts make
passing reference to police behavior as “torture” or like a “rack and
screw.”18  It’s as though we assume we all have the same working
definition or conception of torture in mind.  Do we?
Most people would agree that torture involves physical abuse.19
The quintessential picture of torture in the United States involves a
physical mutilation.” Id. at 334 (emphasis supplied).  Professor Moore does not explain
why sleep deprivation should even be defined as torture, albeit “slight.”
18. For example, in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), the Supreme Court
mentions the word “torture” three times without defining it.  There, several black de-
fendants were subjected to severe beatings until they confessed to a murder; there was
no evidence against them except the confession.  One suspect was hanged by a rope
from a tree and whipped until he confessed.  The Supreme Court noted that he suf-
fered intense pain and agony.  The other defendants were beaten and whipped until
they confessed.  Once, the Supreme Court quoted the trial judge stating that the defen-
dants had been given some time to “recuperate somewhat from the tortures to which
they had been subjected.” Id. at 282.  The second time, the Court implied that the
suspects were compelled by torture to confess. Id. at 285.  Finally, the Court noted, in
an oft-cited statement: “[b]ecause a state may dispense with a jury trial, it does not
follow that it may substitute trial by ordeal.  The rack and torture chamber may not be
substituted for the witness stand.”  The Court concluded: “It would be difficult to con-
ceive of methods more revolting to the sense of justice than those taken to procure the
confessions of these petitioners, and the use of these confessions thus obtained as a
basis for conviction and sentence was a clear denial of due process.” Id. at 286.  Subse-
quent Court decisions have referred to the coercion in Brown as “torture.” See Colorado
v. Connolly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986) (in Brown, police officer extracted confessions
through “brutal torture.”); cf. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (J. Clarke,
dissenting) (calling police behavior “physical torture”).
The Court has not limited its depiction of torture to physical beatings alone. See
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).  In Rochin, the suspect was not beaten,
but was restrained, forced to open his mouth while a stomach tube was placed down his
throat and into his stomach.  An emetic was then administered, which forced vomiting
(and produced capsules of morphine used to convicted the defendant).  The Court
said this conduct by police of opening the petitioner’s mouth and forcibly extracting
the contents of his stomach are methods too closely analogous to the “rack and screw”
(a euphemism for torture) and hence violated due process.
For further discussion of Brown and Rochin, see infra notes 50-56 and 118-120 re-
spectively, and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51 at 197,
U.N. Doc a/39/51 (1984) (defines torture as, inter alia, the intentional infliction or
threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering).
One writer called this form of torture “smacky-face” — the use of whips, pipes,
chairs or other “low-tech” items to beat a person; this was described as the most com-
mon form of torture.  Christopher Hutsul, The Temptation to Use Torture, TORONTO STAR,
March 9, 2003, at F03; see also Stuart Taylor, Should We Hit Him? LEGAL TIMES, March 10,
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suspect being whipped and/or beaten to secure a confession.20
More “exotic” physical abuse may include applying electrodes to va-
rious parts of the body, wrapping a wet towel around a person’s face
until they choke and vomit,21 or inserting sterilized needles under a
suspect’s fingernails.22  In Israel, in a case widely viewed as prohibit-
ing “torture” in that country,23 the Israeli Supreme Court, rather
than defining torture more generally, focused its analysis on several
specific methods of interrogation, most involving physical discom-
fort or pain.24
But the limitations to a definition that focuses solely on physi-
cal abuse or imposing physical pain appear immediately.  How
much physical abuse constitutes torture?  It can’t be that the impo-
sition of any physical discomfort satisfies the definition.  Prison, af-
ter all, involves much physical discomfort and even a certain degree
biguous torture” techniques as opposed to threats to cause pain, deprivation of sleep
and food).
20. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).  The Court reversed the
convictions on due process grounds: “It would be difficult to conceive of methods more
revolting to the sense of justice that those taken to procure the confessions of these
petitioners.” Id. at 286; see infra notes 49-54 and accompanying text; see also Louis
Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 721 (1992) (Supreme Court
in Brown reversed two convictions that were extorted by “brutal torture.”); Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
21. This was one of the techniques used by the French to expose a network of
Algerian terrorists in the 1950’s. See 60 Minutes Transcript, supra note 3, at 6-7.  The “wet
towel until you choke” technique was apparently what broke Abdul Hakim Murad, cap-
tured in the Philippines for blowing up a passenger plane. Id. at 5.
22. See ALAN DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS:  UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT,
RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE (Yale Univ. Press 2002); and comments by Judge Pos-
ner, supra note 17.  Saddam Hussein’s preferred torture methods allegedly include eye
gouging, acid baths, and use of electrodes. See Wolf Blitzer Reports, (CNN television
broadcast, December 2 (2002) (transcript).
23. Israeli Supreme Court Bans Interrogation Abuse of Palestinians, available at www.
cnn.com/World/meast/9909/06/Israel.torture (last visited Jan. 28, 2004) (“the Israeli
Supreme Court on Monday banned the use of torture in interrogations.”
24. Public Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel, H.C. 5100/94
(1999).  The Supreme Court of Israel discussed and condemned shaking, waiting in the
“shabach” position or the frog crouch, excessive tightening of handcuffs, and inten-
tional sleep deprivation.  See also Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 (1978),
where the English High Court held that protracted standing against the wall on tip toes,
covering of the suspect’s head throughout most of the detention, exposing the suspect
to loud noise for prolonged period of time, and deprivation of sleep, food and drink
did not constitute torture, but were prohibited because they treated the suspect in an
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of pain.  Requiring someone to sit still and be questioned might be
physically uncomfortable and even painful to some.  But such is the
price of routine interrogations; it certainly would not be considered
torture under any reasonable definition of that term.25  Indeed, the
case law is replete with confessions that are deemed admissible de-
spite the existence of some physical abuse during the interrogation
process.26
Defining torture based on the degree of pain is also fruitless.
The amount of physical abuse that causes “significant” pain cannot
be measured objectively, and would provide little guidance to
interrogators.27
Moreover, physical pain may not be a necessary condition to
turn an interrogation into torture.  What about non-physical, psy-
chological techniques employed during an interrogation or impris-
onment in order to gain information or cooperation?  For example,
keeping a strong light on in a jail cell, playing loud music 24 hours
a day,28 or constantly awakening a person during the night, may not
be physically painful, but are considered by many to constitute “psy-
chological torture.”29  Assuming that some psychological tactics
25. See, e.g., Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 8478,
8490 (1999) (hereinafter Federal Regulations).
26. See cases compiled in Catherine Hancock, Due Process before Miranda, 70 TUL. L.
REV. 2195, 2203 n.17 (1996).
27. For example, the Convention against Torture (CAT), and the United States
regulations implementing that treaty, declares that torture is the infliction of severe pain
or suffering, and is an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment as opposed to lesser
forms of cruel or inhuman treatment.  It is never explained how one draws the line
between extreme and lesser forms of cruelty.  See Federal Regulations, supra note 25, at
8490.  For further discussion of the CAT see supra note 182.
Defining torture is further complicated by the various ways in which physical abuse
can be used.  That is, one might have one definition of torture when the government
uses physical cruelty against political dissidents to stifle dissent, and another when phys-
ical abuse is used during interrogation to achieve a desirable end.  In the former, the
severity of abuse required to satisfy a definition of torture might be lower than in the
latter.
28. This is allegedly what happened to Zaccarias Moussaoui, who was arrested in
August 2001 and currently faces charges as a co-conspirator in the September 11 bomb-
ings. See supra note 4; “Lindh, Mouussaoui under Tight Restrictions, CNN.com, April 21,
2002, available at www.cnn.com4/21/lindh.moussaoui.ap/index.htm. (Moussaoui had
bright lights on for 24 hours a day; government later agreed to turn lights off at night)
(copy on file with author).
29. Jonathon Alter, for example, discussed subjecting the detainees to “psycholog-
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might be considered torture — how do we draw the line?  What
definition tells us that methods like depriving a suspect of sleep or
causing him “unbearable anxiety”30 may not be acceptable, but that
other psychological ploys, like lying,31 or playing good-cop, bad-
has done this in Panama and elsewhere.  Alter, supra note 3.  Others find such tech-
niques “relatively benign.”  Ann Tyson, U.S. Task: Get Inside Head of Captured bin Laden
Aide, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Apr. 4, 2002; see also Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d
1220, 1248 (9th Cir. 1992) (referring to police behavior of persistent questioning,
where suspect was “hammered, forced, pressured, emotionally worn down, stressed and
infused with a sense of helplessness and fear, all to extract a confession” as sophisti-
cated, psychological torture”) Compare Cooper with U.S. v. Thierman, 678 F.2d 1331 (9th
Cir. 1983); U.S. v. Rutledge, 900 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir. 1990).
Interestingly, the dictionary definition of torture is limited to physical pain and
does not include psychological abuse. See RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DIC-
TIONARY, (2d Ed 1997) (“The act of inflicting excruciating pain, as punishment or re-
venge, as a means of getting a confession or information, or for sheer cruelty.”).
30. A CIA manual apparently used before 1985 advised against physical torture as
counterproductive during interrogation.  “Instead, it discussed using intense fear, deep
exhaustion, solitary confinement, unbearable anxiety, and other forms of psychological
duress against a suspect as ways of destroying his capacity to resist his interrogation.”
Tim Weiner, CIA Taught, Then Dropped, Mental Torture in Latin America, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
29, 1997 at A1.
31. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (confession obtained after suspect
falsely told that his fingerprints had been discovered at the scene of the crime); Michi-
gan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (confession obtained after suspect falsely told that
another suspect had fingered him as the gunman); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969)
(misrepresentation of accomplice’s statements does not render confession involun-
tary); see generally Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in Interrogations, 28
CONN. L. REV. 425, 429 (1996); Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127
U. PA. L. REV. 581, 581-82 (1979); Note, 40 STAN L. REV. 1593 (1988); but see State v.
Cayward, 552 So.2d 971 (Fla. App. 1989) (upholding the suppression of a confession
made after police manufactured false documents and scientific evidence showing se-
men stains on victim’s underwear came from the defendant).
It is not clear why a lie does not rise to the level of torture — why isn’t it as “evil” as
keeping a suspect blindfolded and naked, or subjecting a suspect to loud music all the
time? Cf. SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 30 (1978)
(discussing the “evil nature of lying”).  Once it is determined that the infliction of physi-
cal pain is not a necessary condition for the finding of torture, how do you draw the
line?  Lying can be as coercive and destructive of the human personality as, say, loud
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cop,32 are not only constitutional but are also, for the most part,
accepted by the international community?33
And what about non-physical ploys, like threatening to castrate
a person or threatening to kill a prisoner’s family members, even
when there is no intent to carry out such threats?  No physical harm
actually occurs, yet many would believe these threats to constitute a
form of torture.34
And finally, how does “truth serum” fit into a definition of tor-
ture?35  Many definitions of torture include the use of truth serum,
and many people speak of torture and truth serum in the same
breath.36  Why?  It cannot be the minute pain of the injection.  Af-
32. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court described the
tactic of good cop/bad cop: “In this technique, two agents are employed.  Mutt, the
relentless investigator, who knows the subject is guilty and is not going to waste any
time.  He’s sent a dozen men away for this crime and he’s going to send the subject
away for the full term.  Jeff, on the other hand, is obviously a kindhearted man.  He has
a family himself. He has a brother who was involved in a little scrape like this.  He
disapproves of Mutt and his tactics and will arrange to get him off the case if the subject
will cooperate.  He can’t hold Mutt off for very long.  The subject would be wise to
make a quick decision.” Id. at 452.
33. But see Christopher Slobogin, An Empirically Based Comparison of American and
European Regulatory Approaches to Police Investigation, 22 MICH J. INT’L L 423, 428-29
(2001) (“English courts have declared that misrepresentation of available evidence and
other types of deceit are not permissible.”).
34. In one case, the Supreme Court equated torture with threats of physical harm
that amounted to coercion.  In a case where the petitioner was, among other things,
threatened with potential mob violence, the Court excluded the resulting confession:
“That petitioner was not physically tortured affords no answer to the question whether
the confession was coerced, for ‘there is torture of mind as well as body; the will is as
much affected by fear as by force.”  Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567 (1958); see also
Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949) (threats to family of suspect).
Jordan, for example, made the most notorious terrorist of the 1980’s, Abu Nidal
talk by threatening his family.  Jonathon Alter referred to this technique as torture:
“some torture clearly works.”  Alter, supra note 3.  What makes this torture instead of an
effective interrogation tactic?
35. Truth serum is a term commonly given to various medical compounds, such as
scopolamine, sodium amytal, or sodium pentothal, that lower inhibition by affecting
neurotransmitters in the brain, thus, making a suspect more talkative.  Scott Martelle,
Terror Probe May Use Truth Serum, THE RECORD, Nov. 8, 2001 at a20.  The “low tech expla-
nation is that barbiturates, which includes sodium pentothal — help channels in the
neurotransmitters stay open longer, and in the ensuring flow of gamma-amniobutyric
acid, or GABA, personal inhibitions fall away.” Id.
36. See Akshaye Mukal, The Legal Questions Raised over Truth Serum Use, ECONOMIC
TIMES, July 25, 2002 (human rights community have decried us of truth serum in India
as “tantamount to torture.”); A Shot at Justice: Truth Drug for Godra Accused, INDIAN EX-
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ter all, rape suspects routinely undergo blood tests for DNA or for
AIDS without any allegation that the suspect is being tortured.37
The Supreme Court has sanctioned blood tests for drug testing
without any discussion as to whether this might constitute torture.38
called it torture because it was physical abuse to extract information).  A “60 Minutes”
episode on torture included a mention of truth serum (essentially dismissing it as inef-
fective), but mere inclusion of the topic on a show titled “torture” indicates that some
connection between the two was implicitly made. See 60 Minutes Transcript, supra note 3;
see also Wolf Blitzer Transcripts, supra note 14 (critics of using sodium pentothal argue
that it would amount to a form of torture.”); see also Kenneth Roth: Human Rights Watch
(calling use of truth serum “a notch” from torture; later in same show calls it “psycho-
logical terrorism”); CNN, The Point with Greta van Susteren, Tracking the Terrorists, CNN
Transcripts, October 26, 2001, available at http//www.cnn.com/transcripts/0110/26/
tpt.00html (copy on file with author).
The Convention against Torture includes truth serum as prohibited torture, and
the Regulations adopted by the United States to implement the Convention seemingly
agree. See Federal Regulations, supra note 25 at 8490 (torture includes the administration
or application or threatened administration or application, of mind altering substances
or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the sense or the personality).
37. See e.g., People v. Thomas, 139 Misc. 2d 1072, (1988) (court has inherent dis-
cretionary power to order the defendant to submit to a blood test because the rape
victim has a right to know whether she may have been exposed to the AIDS virus); Doe
v. Connell, 583 N.Y.S.2d 7070 (App. Div. 1992) (nonconsensual extraction of defen-
dant’s blood for HIV testing is allowable pursuant to substantial governmental interest
in curbing the transmission of AIDS).
38. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); see
also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (government may use blood sample
against defendant obtained by medical personnel while defendant was unconscious).
There was no discussion of torture, or potential substantive due process violations in
Skinner; rather the case focused on the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.  There potentially may be a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion with the use of truth serum injections.  The Supreme Court has held in the context
of bloods tests for drug testing that both the physical invasion of the skin, and the
analyzing of that blood sample for private information, constitutes a search under the
Fourth Amendment. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617.  The Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit such a search, however; it merely requires that it be reasonable.  Thus, at worst,
the use of truth serum might require that the officers obtain a search warrant based
upon probable cause to believe the individual has relevant information.  It is very possi-
ble, however, that the Court would not even require a warrant, and would simply de-
mand that the search be “reasonable.”  In cases of special government need beyond the
normal requirements of law enforcement, the Court has held that a warrant require-
ment and even the requirement of individualized suspicion may be dispensed with. See
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).  The pin prick involved in deliver-
ing the “truth serum” is likely to be viewed as a minimal intrusion involving virtually no
risk, trauma or pain, and, given the special government need to fight terrorism, might
be justified without probable cause or a warrant. Cf Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619; see also
Government of Virgin Islands v. Roberts, 756 F. Supp. 198 (Dist. Ct. V.I. 1991) (removal
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Such minimal level of discomfort surely cannot be differentiated
from other types of discomfort that occur all the time — from wear-
ing handcuffs, to being hungry before dinner is served, to being
slightly chilled or too warm.  Yet no one suggests that such physical
discomfort would violate the Geneva Convention and other proto-
cols against “torture.”39
Perhaps the operative factor is that “truth serum” is an affront
to human dignity because it overcomes a person’s will.  Yet, over-
coming a person’s will, by itself, is not sufficient for a finding of
torture.  Surely, there are numerous behaviors that can be said to
overcome a person’s will, including lying and trickery, which are
not viewed as torture. Why then, is the use of truth serum, which by
all accounts acts similarly to alcohol, considered torture as opposed
to cruel and inhumane behavior?
The point I am trying to make is that the boundaries of the
concept of torture are surprisingly blurry.  Some commentators de-
fine torture incredibly broadly to include the infliction of virtually
any level of physical or emotional pain.  For example, Amnesty In-
ternational and others speak of torture when describing sexual
abuse of women prisoners,40 police abuse of suspects by physical
brutality, overcrowded cells, the use of implements such as stun
guns,41 and the application of the death penalty.42  Thus, they ac-
cuse the United States of either failing to prevent or, more signifi-
cantly, of promoting torture.43  The problem with such a definition
is that it knows no real limits; if virtually anything can constitute
torture, the concept loses some of its ability to shock and disgust.
Moreover, universal condemnation may evaporate when the defini-
tion is so all encompassing.  For example, the United States likely
39. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
40. Amnesty International, “Not Part of My Sentence”: Violations of the Human Rights
of Women in Custody: Overview (Mar. 1999), available at http//www.amnestyusa.org/
rightsforall/women/overview.html 2/21/02 (“Sexual abuse of women inmates is tor-
ture, plain and simple” said Dr. Schultz, executive director of Amnesty International
USA)
41. See Associated Press, US Police Too Brutal, Says Report by Amnesty, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, May 10, 2000 (in its report, Amnesty International cited the use of pepper spray
and electric shock devices as punishments that constitute torture).
42. Coalition against Torture and Racial Discrimination, Torture in the United
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would not be willing to embrace a definition of torture that in-
cludes overcrowded jail cells and the death penalty.44
Moreover, to condemn everything equally as torture may lead
to the unintended result of creating a sliding scale of torture — a
“rating” of torture methods.  For example, one commentator sug-
gested that “medium” or “moderate” torture might be acceptable to
prevent future terrorist attacks.45  What exactly is that, and how do
we set limits?  Is moderate torture a “moderate” amount of physical
beating?  Some shaking but not “extreme” shaking?
The inability to precisely define torture presents some difficul-
ties for this paper.  Rather than attempt an all-encompassing defini-
tion, I will try whenever possible to deal with specific interrogation
tactics, and only use the word “torture” as a generic term when a
more precise delineation is not necessary to the discussion.  In
those cases, the reader should simply bear in mind the type of
abuse that most people would agree constitutes torture.
II. THE LAW OF INTERROGATION AND TORTURE:
WHAT LIMITS CURRENTLY EXIST?
Police interrogations of suspects are generally constrained by
two constitutional principles.  First, when questioning a suspect, the
government cannot violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’
requirement for due process of law.  The due process clause pro-
vides that “no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or prop-
erty without due process of law.”46  Second, the Fifth Amendment’s
privilege against compelled self-incrimination cannot be in-
44. In fact, when the United States passed regulations implementing the Conven-
tion against Torture, it specifically modified the definition of torture so that it does not
include the death penalty applied consistently with the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. See Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg.
8478, 8482 (Feb. 19, 1999).
45. See comments made by Yonah Alexander: “One has to use whatever resources
one has to obtain information, even if you have to forego some civil liberties.  In other
words, some sort of moderate torture, if you will, or some physical force that is needed
in order to save lives.” CNN the Point with Greta Van Susteren:  Tracking the Terrorists,
October 26, 2001, available at http//www.cnn/transcripts/0110/26/tpt.00,html (copy
on file with author); see also, Alter supra note 3 (Israeli law leaves room for “moderate”
physical pressure in ticking bomb cases.)
46. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV., § 1 (Fifth Amendment guarantees due process in
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fringed:47  “[n]o Person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself.”48  In addition, some restriction on
interrogation tactics may also be imposed by international law.
Each of these possible constraints is discussed below.  It should be
noted that the discussion that follows is descriptive and predictive;
it is not a normative assessment of whether the Constitution should
be interpreted to prohibit torture.  In other words, the focus of this
section is entirely on whether torture violates the due process
clause and the privilege against self-incrimination under current
law and not what these rights should mean.
A. Due Process Constraints on Interrogation
Two lines of precedent support the contention that torture of
suspected terrorists should not be allowed.  The Supreme Court has
held that coerced confessions are not admissible in court, whether
the confession is obtained by physical brutality, psychological pres-
sure that overbears the will of the accused, or drugs.  There is also
some case law indicating that the Due Process Clause is violated by
improper interrogation techniques, regardless of whether any in-
formation obtained is ever admitted in court.  As to both lines of
cases, however, an argument can be made that there is no prohibi-
tion against torture of suspected terrorists when necessary to pro-
tect against an imminent threat to public safety.  These arguments
are discussed below.
1. Due Process Concerns When the Product of
Interrogation is to be Used at Trial
Case law places substantial limits on the means government of-
ficials may use to interrogate suspects when the resulting evidence
47. Due process was the most common constitutional claim raised to exclude con-
fessions between 1930’s and the 1960’s.  In 1964, the Supreme Court’s decision in Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) brought the Fifth Amendment’s right against
compelled self-incrimination into the forefront of confessions in the 1960’s, see infra
notes 144-146, but both remain important doctrines today. See Catherine Hancock, Due
Process before Miranda, TUL. L. REV. 2195, 2198 (1996) (“Despite the avalanche of Mi-
randa law since 1966, Due Process doctrine remains a significant source of rights for
confession cases.”); JAMES ACKER AND DAVID BRODY, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A CONTEMPO-
RARY PERSPECTIVE 251 (1999) (same).
48. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V; see supra note 46 and accompanying text. (the Four-
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is to be used in court.  First, admission in a court of law of any
statement obtained after severe physical abuse or threats of abuse
constitutes a per se constitutional violation.  In 1936, for the first
time, the Supreme Court rejected a state court’s admission of a con-
fession because the police interrogation methods violated the due
process clause.49  In Brown v. Mississippi, a capital murder convic-
tion was based solely on the confessions of several African American
youths, obtained after savage beatings by white officers.50  Specifi-
cally, one of the defendants was hung on a rope from a limb of a
tree; when he continued to protest his innocence, he was let down,
tied to a tree and whipped.  In the words of the state court judge,
the defendant suffered “intense pain and agony.”51  The defendant
was later severely whipped by a police deputy, and told that the
whipping would continue until he signed a confession written by
the deputy.  Not surprisingly, he signed the confession.  The other
defendants suffered a similar fate — they were stripped and
whipped with a leather strap with buckles on it until they
confessed.52
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the convictions in
Brown.  The Court noted that a state might regulate its own crimi-
nal process unless doing so “offends some principle to justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental.”53  Referring to the police behavior as
“compulsion by torture to extort a confession,”54 the Court found
that “it would be difficult to conceive of methods more revolting to
the sense of justice than those taken to procure the confessions of
these petitioners, and the use of the confessions thus obtained as
49. For an interesting discussion of some cases prior to 1936, see generally 2 John
Henry Wigmore, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 833 (2d ed. 1923).
50. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).  Seeds of the voluntariness doctrine
relied on in Brown had were rooted in English common law developed in the 1600’s.
See Laurence A. Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court’s Voluntariness Doctrine
in Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U. J. L.Q 59, 94 (1988).  For a discussion of the impor-
tance of the Brown case, particularly its racial aspects, see Michael Louis Seidman, Brown
and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673 (1992).
51. Brown, 297 U.S. at 281.
52. Id. at 282.
53. Id. at 285 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105; Rogers v. Peck,
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the basis for conviction and sentence was a clear denial of due
process.”55
Since Brown, the Supreme Court has invalidated numerous
confessions elicited in violation of a suspect’s due process rights.56
But the contours of due process have never been adequately de-
fined.  In part, the confusion occurs because the ultimate objective
of a due process analysis is often obfuscated.57  Is it the reliability of
the confession that is of predominant concern?  Is the due process
test primarily designed to protect against the admission of untrust-
worthy evidence?58  During the early 1900’s, most courts seemed to
focus on the reliability of a confession in assessing a potential due
process violation.  If reliability of confessions is the ultimate con-
cern, courts might be inclined to admit a confession so long as it is
consistent with the overwhelming weight of the evidence, even if
the police tactics were suspect.59  Moreover, due process might not
be violated by an interrogation whose fruits were never intended to
be and were not admitted at trial since there would be no real relia-
bility issue in such a case.
55. Id. at 286.
56. Since Brown, the Supreme Court has considered approximately 35 confession
cases on due process grounds alone. See CHARLES WHITEBREAD AND CHRISTOPHER
SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 401 (4th ed.
2000).
57. As Professor Lawrence Herman writes: “A careful reading of the Court’s more
than forty involuntary confession cases discloses not one but five different objec-
tives. . ..The objectives are: (1) to deter the police from engaging in conduct that may
produce an unreliable confession; (2) to deter the police from engaging in conduct so
offensive to the minimum standards of a civilized society that it shocks the conscience
of the Court; (3) to deter the police from engaging in less than shocking misconduct;
(4) to deter the police from using the techniques of an inquisitorial system and to
encourage them to use the techniques of an accusatorial system; and (5) to deter the
police from overbearing the suspect’s will.  . . .[e]ach of the objectives is problematic in
one or more ways, and the very number of them obfuscates rather than clarifies”  Law-
rence Herman, The Supreme Court, The Attorney General, and The Good Old Days of Police
Interrogation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 749-50, 754-55 (1987) (reprinted in Dressler and
Thomas, supra note 2, at 571).
58. See Yale Kamisar, What is an Involuntary Confession?  Some Comments on Inbau and
Reid’s Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728 (1963) (suggesting
that at least at the beginning, the due process test was designed to protect against unre-
liable confessions).
59. Cf. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113-14 (due process reliability analysis
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By the 1950’s, due process analysis came to focus on the volun-
tariness of a confession, without regard to its reliability.60  Reliability
of the evidence at trial was irrelevant or at most secondary.  Instead,
courts considered the methods used to obtain a confession and the
effect of such tactics on a suspect’s free will.61  In other words, due
process reflected a concern for both “the propriety of particular
police conduct as well as its probable effect on the suspect’s ability
to resist.”62  Thus, interrogation tactics “repellent to civilized stan-
dards of decency, or which, under the circumstances, were thought
to apply a degree of pressure to an individual which unfairly im-
paired his capacity to make a rational choice, violates due
process.”63
60. Brown, for example, seemed to rely on both justifications.  The Court empha-
sized the unreliability of the confessions, and scolded the lower court since the confes-
sions were the only evidence against the defendants.  But the Court was clearly revolted
by the behavior of the police and the use of methods that offend “principles of justice
so rooted in the tradition and conscience of people as to be ranked as fundamental.”
Brown, 297 U.S. at 285.
61. The shift in thinking can be reflected in the following Supreme Court cases
during an approximately ten year time period: Spano v. N.Y., 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959)
(“[T]he abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not turn alone
on their inherent trustworthiness.”) (emphasis supplied); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 190-91 (1952) (“Use of involuntary verbal confessions is constitutionally obnoxious
not only because of their unreliability.  They are inadmissible under the due process
clause even though statements contained in them may be independently established as
true.  Coerced confessions offend the community’s sense of fair play and decency”);
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961) (question is whether the state overbore the
will of the suspect, without “any regard” to truth or falsity of the statement)(emphasis
supplied); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 518 (1963) (quoting Rogers, 365 U.S. at
541) (“Indeed, in many of the cases in which the command of the due process clause
has compelled us to reverse state convictions involving the use of confessions obtained
by impermissible methods independent corroborating evidence left little doubt of the
truth of what the defendant had confessed.  Despite such verification, confessions were
found to be the product of constitutionally impermissible methods in their induce-
ment.”); see also Welsh S. White, What is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUT. L. REV.
2001, 2002 (1998) (suggesting that by the 1960’s due process cases came to focus on the
voluntariness of the confession).
62. White, supra note 61, at 2010.
63. Paul Bator & James Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and the Right to
Counsel: Basic Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 62, 73 (1966).
In Columbe v. Connecticut, Justice Frankfurter provided an oft-cited description of  the
voluntariness test:
“The inquiry whether, in a particular case, a confession was voluntarily or
involuntarily made involves, at the least, a three phased process.  First, there
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The application of due process to the torture debate is ham-
pered in part by uncertainty as to the ultimate objective of the due
process clause.  If reliability of a confession is the key, a suspect
whose confession is never intended to be offered into evidence may
not have a viable due process claim.  Moreover, a suspect who fails
to confess, but who claims to have been tortured, may not have a
due process claim.  And, of course, the reliability standard does not
aid a torture victim whose confession turns out to be extremely
“reliable.”64
On the other hand, concerns about ensuring acceptable police
behavior and maintaining standards of decency and civility raise
their own difficulties for the courts.  Every case is fact specific and
depends on normative judgments relating to the legitimacy of par-
ticular police practices — a question the courts have not addressed
in the context of a terrorist suspect who might hold the key to an
imminent attack on civilians.
Finally, determining that a suspect’s will has been overcome
has also proven elusive.65  Drawing such a conclusion is difficult be-
nological’ occurrences and events surrounding the confession.  Second, be-
cause the concept of ‘voluntariness’ is one which concerns a mental state,
there is the imaginative recreation, largely inferential, of internal, psycho-
logical fact.  Third, there is the application to the psychological fact of stan-
dards for judgment informed by the largely legal conceptions ordinarily
characterized as rules of law but which, also, comprehend both inductive
form and anticipation of factual circumstances.”  367 U.S. 568, 603 (1961).
64. Of course, torture tactics, as will be discussed in Section III, often raise reliabil-
ity questions.  But there are undoubtedly circumstances where police interrogation
techniques that may constitute torture lead to verifiable and accurate incriminating
statements. See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
65. This would include not only the precise behavior of the police (for example,
how many hours was the suspect sleep deprived?) but also the individual characteristics
of the suspect. See Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958) (pointing out that suspect
was well educated); Galego v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962) (youth of suspect factor in
free will); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (discussing suspects psychological
problems).
Of course, this begs the question of whether the real factual circumstances sur-
rounding the interrogation can ever be accurately assessed.  Until all interrogations are
videotaped, it is often a swearing match between the suspect’s claims and the police.
Although the imposition of Miranda rights has brought some confessions somewhat
“out of the closet,” see WILLIAM A. GELLER, VIDEOTAPING INTERROGATION & CONFESSIONS,
IN THE MIRANDA DEBATE:  LAW, JUSTICE AND POLICY 303 (Richard A. Leo & George C.
Thomas eds., 1998) (in 1990, about a third of all police departments serving more than
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cause it relies in part on normative questions that the courts have
never addressed.  As Professor Welsh White notes: “assessing
whether a police practice unduly impairs a suspect’s freedom of
choice depends on the normative judgment of how much mental
freedom should be afforded the suspect . . . as well as an empirical
assessment of how much freedom of choice he had at the time he
confessed. ”66  Professor White concludes that the Supreme Court
has never addressed these normative questions,67 much less estab-
lished a methodology for proving that a particular police practice
has overcome the will of the suspect.  Often, therefore, the court
merely makes a conclusion as to the voluntariness of a confession,
without any detailed analysis of the underlying normative issues.
Nonetheless, despite the widely acknowledged ambiguities and
difficulties inherent in a due process analysis, certain basic precepts
can safely be stated.  First, admission in a court of law of any state-
ment obtained after severe physical abuse, or threats of such abuse,
would constitute a per se constitutional violation.68  This is the clear
lesson from Brown: evidence obtained after police engage in severe
physical abuse will be excluded under the due process clause.  In
such a case, distrust of the confession’s reliability, abhorrence of
the state’s behavior, and concern about the individual’s will being
overcome, all coalesce to require that the evidence be suppressed.
Second, confessions obtained by any coercive method that the
court believes overcomes the will of the accused will not be admissi-
ble.69  For example, in Mincey v. Arizona,70 the Supreme Court
found that a confession elicited from a patient who had just been
by police.  This secrecy is likely magnified manifold when the police interrogate terror-
ist suspects.
66. White, supra note 61, at 2010.
67. Id.
68. Brown, 297 U.S. at 278; Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 182 (1953) (Jackson
J.) (overruled-in-part by, Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (“physical violence or
threat of it . . .invalidates confessions. . .and is universally condemned by law. . ..[Thus]
there is no need to weigh or measure its effects on the will of the individual victim.”);
Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172 (struggle to forcibly open suspect’s mouth and forcibly extract
stomach contents analogous to rack and screw for constitutional purposes and the con-
tent is not admissible); Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967) (evidence inadmissible
when police officer held gun to head of suspect to obtain confession).
69. See Colorado v. Connolly, 479 U.S. 157 (1987) (to establish a due process viola-
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shot, was in severe pain, could not speak, and frequently asked for
an attorney, to be involuntary.  As the Court noted:
It is hard to imagine a situation less conducive to the exer-
cise of ‘a rational intellect and a free will’ than Mincey’s.
He had been seriously wounded . . . had arrived at the
hospital ‘depressed almost to the point of coma’. . . .  He
complained . . . that the pain in his leg was unbearable . . .
He was evidently confused and unable to think clearly
about either the events of the afternoon or the circum-
stances of his interrogation [and, lying on his back on a
hospital bed he was] ‘at the complete mercy’ of [his
interrogator].71
The undisputed evidence, according to the Court, made clear
that Mincey did not want to answer the questions, but “weakened by
pain and shock, isolated from family, friends and legal counsel, and
barely conscious, his will was simply overborne.  Due process of law
requires that statements obtained as these were cannot be used in
any way against a defendant at his trial.”72
Similarly, a confession induced by scientific methods that med-
ically or otherwise override the will of the accused will be inadmissi-
ble.  For example, the use of “truth serum” would almost certainly
render a confession inadmissible in a court of law because an ac-
cused’s self-determination and free will would be violated in the
most basic sense.  In Townsend v. Sain,73 the Supreme Court sup-
pressed a confession so induced.  In that case, Townsend, a
nineteen-year-old heroin addict, was arrested in connection with a
robbery and murder.  Upon his arrest, he was questioned and de-
nied having committed any crimes.  A day or so later, during fur-
ther questioning, Townsend complained of stomach pains and was
suffering from severe withdrawal symptoms.  A doctor arrived, and,
70. 437 U.S. 385 (1978); cf. Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) (government
psychiatrist’s questioning of sleep deprived suspect which used almost hypnosis-like
methods to elicit confession renders resulting confession involuntary).
71. Mincey, 437 U.S. 398.
72. Id. at 401-02.  The Court held that the confession must be suppressed under
the due process clause even though there was ample evidence aside from the confession
to support the conviction. Id at 385. But see discussion of Chavez v. Martinez, infra
notes 96-111.
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in the presence of the police, administered a dose of Phenobarbital
and hyoscine to alleviate the withdrawal symptoms.  Hyoscine is the
same as scopolamine — the drug often called “truth serum.”74
Shortly after the doctor left, the police obtained a full confession.
In remanding the case for a hearing on the admissibility of the con-
fession, the majority noted the standard for a voluntary confession
under the due process clause:
If an individual’s will was overborne or his confession not
‘the product of a rational intellect and a free will,” his
confession is inadmissible because coerced.  These stan-
dards are applicable whether a confession is the product
of physical intimidation or psychological pressure . . . .  It
is difficult to imagine a situation in which a confession
would be less the product of a free intellect, less volun-
tary, than when brought about by a drug having the effect
of a “truth serum.75
Indeed, although the Court split on the question of whether
the defendant should receive a new evidentiary hearing, all nine
members of the Supreme Court agreed, “a confession induced by
the administration of drugs is constitutionally inadmissible in a
criminal trial.”76
Third, due process would require the exclusion of confessions
induced by what most people would refer to as more “subtle” forms
of torture (if torture at all) — psychological tactics to obtain confes-
sions.77  For example, the Court has condemned such tactics as
lengthy incommunicado detentions,78 sleep deprivation,79 and in-
74. Id. at 298.
75. Id. at 307-08.
76. Id. at 326.  Justices Stewart, Clark, Harlan and White dissented from the grant
of a de novo evidentiary hearing, but stated at the outset, “as to the underlying issue of
constitutional law, I completely agree that a confession induced by the administration
of drugs is constitutionally inadmissible in a criminal trial.” But cf. United States v.
George, 987 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1993) (defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda rights
even when in hospital, on medication, and in pain); United States v. Martin, 781 F.2d
671, 673-74 (9th Cir. 1988) (statement voluntary even though defendant had been
given Demerol, a strong pain killer).
77. Of course, some of these techniques would not even rise to the level of most
person’s conception of torture, but the evidence would still be inadmissible under the
due process clause as involuntary.
78. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 534 (1963) (“We cannot blind ourselves
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voluntary nakedness.80  Additionally, in Chambers v. Florida,81 the
Court overturned the admission of a confession procured during
protracted questioning over seven days, while the prisoner was iso-
lated from his family and denied assistance of counsel.  Such cir-
cumstances were “calculated to break the strongest nerves and the
stoutest resistance.”82
The Supreme Court has consistently condemned, as violating
notions of due process, the admission of evidence obtained as a
result of interrogation methods that could be described as tor-
ture.83  Although the case law seems to overwhelmingly reject such
tactics, it does not address the core issues raised by the current dia-
logue on torture.  Most commentators do not advocate the use of
torture in order to obtain evidence for prosecuting a suspect — and
for good reason.  The above discussion demonstrates that the due
process clause would preclude the admission of such evidence.  The
key question raised by the debate over the use of torture is narrow:
what is the role of due process in limiting police behavior when the
the secret and incommunicado detention and interrogation are devises adapted and
used to extort confessions from suspects.”); see also Aschcroft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143
(1944) (36 hours of consecutive questioning denounced); Reck v Pate, 367 U.S. 433
(1961)(defendant — 19 year-old with subnormal intelligence — held incommunicado
for nearly four days, subjected to relentless and incessant interrogation, and food de-
prived: circumstances “so inherently coercive that its very existence is irreconcilable
with the possession of mental freedom”).
79. Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519 (1968) (condemned 18 hour interroga-
tion during which time suspect deprived of sleep and food); Ashcroft, 322 U.S. 143
(defendant questioned for 36 hours, without sleep or rest).
80. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 405 (1945) (“If the confession had been
the product of persistent questioning while Malinsky stood stripped and naked we
would have a clear case [of an involuntary confession.]  But it was not.”).  The confes-
sion in Malinksi was ultimately found involuntary for a number of other reasons.
81. 309 U.S. 227, 238-39 (1940).
82. Id. at 238-39.  The Court was also concerned that the “third degree” had his-
torically been used against the most disadvantaged in society — the poorest, least edu-
cated, and least influential. Id. at 238 n.11; accord, Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 555
(1942).
83. The fact that the tortured suspect may not be a United States citizen is irrele-
vant for constitutional purposes.  The guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments still apply.  As the Court noted in Matthews v. Diaz, “there are literally millions of
aliens within the jurisdiction of the United States.  The Fifth Amendment, as well as the
Fourteenth Amendment protects every one of them from deprivation of life, liberty or
property without due process of law.  Even one whose presence in this country is unlaw-






      04/27/2004   12:08:32
18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 116 Side B      04/27/2004   12:08:32
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\48-1-2\NLR404.txt unknown Seq: 26 16-APR-04 10:36
226 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
information is never intended to be used — and is not introduced
— in a criminal trial?  In other words, is there a due process viola-
tion if the police act inappropriately or even horrifically, but the
resulting confession is never used against the suspect in a court of
law?
2. Due Process Concerns When the Product of the
Interrogation is Not to be Used at Trial
There is certainly language in Supreme Court jurisprudence
supporting the position that there is no due process violation where
a statement obtained by torture is not used against a suspect.  In
virtually all involuntary confession cases brought under the due
process clause, it seems to be the use of a coerced confession in the
criminal trial that constitutes the Constitutional violation.  For ex-
ample, in Leyra v. Denno,84 the Court noted, “use in a state criminal
trial of a defendant’s confession obtained by coercion — whether
physical or mental — is forbidden by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.”85  Similarly, in Lisenba v. California,86 the Court noted, “peti-
tioner does not and cannot ask redress in this proceeding for any
disregard of due process prior to the trial.  The gravaman of his
complaint is the unfairness of the use of his confession and what
occurred in [its] procurement is relevant only as it bears on that
issue.”87  Finally, in Mincey v. Arizona,88 the Court held that “any
criminal trial use of a defendant’s involuntary statement is a denial
of due process of law, even though there is ample evidence aside
from the confession to support the conviction.”89
It is true that virtually all voluntariness cases have arisen in the
context of a criminal defendant asking the courts to apply the ex-
clusionary rule — to hold that coerced confessions are inadmissible
in court because admission of such evidence violates the due pro-
cess clause.  And it is true that most court opinions have, without
fail, linked the violation of due process to a confession’s admission
at trial.  But is such linkage mere happenstance — made simply
84. 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
85. Id. at 558.
86. 314 U.S. 219  (1941).
87. Id. at 235 (emphasis supplied).
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because that is the context in which claims have thus far been
made?  Or, is this linkage not one borne of the procedural posture
of a case, but rather based on a substantive finding that the due
process clause is violated when and only when, an involuntary con-
fession is introduced in a court of law?
This point — that torture is permissible under the due process
clause only if used in extreme situations, only to obtain information
for investigative purposes, and not to acquire evidence for prosecu-
tion — is one made repeatedly by commentator’s post-September
11.90  Thus, the legal question: does coercive questioning by itself
violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amend-
ments?  While the Supreme Court has consistently found that any
use, in a criminal trial, of a defendant’s involuntary statement is a
denial of due process, should the same conclusion inure when the
objective of the state is not to obtain evidence but to save lives?91
The courts of appeals have considered this question with conflict-
ing results.  The Ninth Circuit appears to be the main proponent of
the position that a due process violation occurs at the moment co-
ercive questioning overcomes the will of the suspect, regardless of
whether the evidence is ever used at trial.  For example, in Cooper v.
Dupnik,92 officers in the Tucson Police Department utilized interro-
gation techniques purposely calculated to wear the suspect down,
without any intention of using the evidence in court.  Cooper, sus-
pected of being a serial rapist, despite strong evidence that he was
innocent, was held incommunicado for almost 24 hours and ques-
tioned without counsel, despite his repeated requests for an attor-
ney.93  After being released from custody, Cooper filed a civil rights
action against the officers, alleging a violation of his Fourteenth
90. See supra notes 12-13.
91. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).  With one exception, every
Supreme Court decision up to now has involved the question of the admissibility of
evidence in a criminal trial. See Brief for Petitioner Ben Chavez, Chavez v. Martinez,
No. 01-1444, at 25 (2002) (hereinafter, Brief for Petitioner).  The one exception con-
cerned the admissibility of evidence in a civil trial; the Court permitted the introduc-
tion of an involuntary confession there. Id at 25 (citing U.S. ex rel Bilokumsky v. Tod,
263 U.S. 149 (1923)).
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and Fifth Amendment rights.94  The Court of Appeals sustained
Cooper’s Fourteenth Amendment claim:
Can the coercing by police of a statement from a suspect
in custody ripen into a full-blown Constitutional violation
only if and when the statement is tendered and used
against the declarant?  We think not. . . . The due process
violation caused by coercive behavior of law-enforcement
officers in pursuit of a confession is complete with the co-
ercive behavior itself.95
Almost a decade later, the Ninth Circuit revisited this issue,
and, relying heavily on Cooper, again found that abusive police ques-
tioning violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  It was this
case — Chavez v. Martinez96 — which the Supreme Court consid-
ered last term.
The facts of Martinez are, as one scholar put it, quite “tragic.”97
There, two Oxnard police officers stopped Oliverio Martinez, a
farm worker, while riding his bicycle near suspected narcotics activ-
ity.  Martinez complied with a request to get off his bike, but started
running after the police discovered a knife during a pat down
search.  He was tackled, and, during the scuffle, one officer called
out that Martinez was trying to grab his gun.  A second officer then
fired several shots at Martinez, hitting him once in the eye and
blinding him, once in the spine, and three times in the legs, leaving
him paralyzed.98
Ben Chavez, a patrol supervisor, accompanied Martinez to the
hospital.  In the ambulance and at the hospital, Chavez demanded
information about the shooting.  He apparently was concerned that
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1244-45.  The Ninth Circuit’s holding, however, has not met with wide-
spread approval.  Numerous other courts of appeals have taken exception with its hold-
ing, although most of those cases focus on the privilege against self-incrimination
rather than due process. See Wiley v. Doory, 14 F.3d 993, 996 (4th Cir. 1994) (disagree-
ing with Fifth Amendment holding in Cooper); Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1164
(4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (same); Giuffre v. Bissell, 31 F.3d 1241, 1256 (3d Cir. 1994)
(same); United States v. Palomo, 80 F.3d 138, 142 (5th Cir. 1996) (no Fifth Amend-
ment claim where statement not used against him).
96. 583 U.S. 760 (2003).
97. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court Undermines Fifth Amendment Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, DAILY JOURNAL, July 2003.
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Martinez would not survive and wanted to obtain his version of the
police shooting.  Martinez apparently feared that he would not get
medical treatment if he did not respond.  During the period of
questioning, which was spread over a 45 minutes, Martinez admit-
ted that he fought with the police, that he had taken the gun and
pointed it at an officer, and that he had used heroin and had been
drinking.
Martinez survived and no criminal charges were filed, so his
statements to Chavez were never used against him in any criminal
proceeding.99  Rather, Martinez filed a civil rights complaint under
federal law,100 alleging that the officers had violated his constitu-
tional rights by, among other things, subjecting him to a coercive
interrogation while he was receiving medical treatment.101
Chavez and the other defendants argued that because they
could not reasonably have known that their conduct violated
99. There was no criminal proceeding ever instituted against him.  He had been
in the vicinity of a narcotics stakeout — a classic case of wrong place, wrong time.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  State officials performing discretionary functions may be
sued when they act under color of state law, and deprive a person of their constitutional
rights. See generally Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).  In order to allow ample room
for mistaken judgment, the law allows those sued to assert a qualified immunity de-
fense. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (law gives ample room for mis-
taken judgment by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law).  To determine if a government official is entitled to qualified immu-
nity, the following analysis is used: First, taking the facts most favorable to the plaintiff,
do the facts show that the action complained of constituted a violation of his or her
constitutional rights?  If so, is the right clearly established, so that it would be clear to
the reasonable officer that the conduct was unlawful?  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194
(2001); see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603
(1999).
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Names Agents, the Supreme Court created an implied
private cause of action for damages against federal officials when (1) the government
official acts under “color of authority” and (2) the official deprived the individual of his
constitutional rights.  403 U.S. 388 (1971); see also Barr v. Matteo, 60 U.S. 564, 575
(1959).  After showing these two elements, the plaintiff has sustained his burden of
persuasion, but the government officials may still have a qualified immunity claim. See
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
101. Martinez relied heavily on Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 384 (1978). Compare
Mincey with Companeria v. Reid, 891 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1989).
Martinez also claimed that the police violated his constitutional rights when they
stopped him without probable cause and when that they used excessive force, both in
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.  The District Court denied summary judg-
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“clearly established” constitutional rights, they were protected from
liability under the civil rights laws by qualified immunity.  Indeed,
they argued that because Martinez’s statements were never intro-
duced in a criminal trial, no constitutional violation had occurred.
The Ninth Circuit rejected the officers’ claims, finding that
Martinez’s constitutional rights had been violated.  “The Fifth [and
Fourteenth] Amendment’s purpose is to prevent coercive interro-
gation practices that are destructive of human dignity . . . [E]ven
though Martinez’s statements were not used against him in a crimi-
nal proceeding, Chavez’s coercive questioning violated Martinez’s
[constitutional] rights.”102  In other words, “the due process viola-
tion caused by coercive behavior of law enforcement officers in pur-
suit of a confession is complete with the coercive behavior itself . . . .
The actual use or attempted use of that coerced statement in a
court of law is not necessary to complete the affront to the
Constitution.”103
Support for such a position rests, in part, from a belief that a
contrary holding would lead to a nonsensical result.  If the admis-
sion of a coerced confession at trial were the only measure of a
constitutional violation, a guilty party who is unlawfully interro-
gated and as a result, confesses, has been denied his constitutional
rights and thus, has a civil action against his interrogators.  But an
innocent person who has nothing to confess, and is subjected to the
exact same — or even worse — coercive interrogation will have suf-
fered no violation and will have no civil remedy.  Such a result
would run counter to any notion of fairness.  As the Ninth Circuit
concluded, “Our law has many subtleties and turnings, but such a
counter-intuitive result cannot be, and is not, the law.”104
Finding that Martinez’s constitutional rights were established
at the time of the violation, the Ninth Circuit held that Martinez’s
complaint stated a viable civil rights claim.  The officers and the city
defendants appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.105
In Chavez, the Supreme Court held, for the first time, that a
victim of police brutality could bring a cause of action under the
102. Martinez, 270 F.3d at 857.
103. Id. at 857, quoting Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1244-45.
104. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1237.






      04/27/2004   12:08:32
18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 119 Side A      04/27/2004   12:08:32
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\48-1-2\NLR404.txt unknown Seq: 31 16-APR-04 10:36
2003] TORTURE 231
due process clause even though there was no criminal trial.  The
decision of the Court, however, was badly splintered.  Justices
Thomas, Rehnquist and Scalia found that police brutality could
constitute a substantive due process violation, but held that Marti-
nez’s case did not rise to the level of such a violation.106  Souter and
Breyer found that brutality that “shocks the conscience” violates
substantive due process, but they did not decide whether the behav-
ior here was sufficiently shocking.  Instead, they suggested a re-
mand to determine if such a violation occurred on the record.  Not
only did Justices Kennedy, Stevens and Ginsberg agree that physical
brutality by the government can constitute a substantive due pro-
cess violation, but also they believed that the record in Martinez’s
case adequately supported a finding of such a constitutional viola-
tion.  Nevertheless, they agreed to remand the case in order to as-
semble a majority on this issue.  Thus, the opinion of the Court was
delivered by Justice Souter who wrote that “[w]hether Martinez may
pursue a claim of liability for a substantive due process violation
is. . . an issue that should be addressed on remand, along with the
scope and merits of any such action that may be found open to
him.”107  No further guidance for determining the scope or applica-
tion of the due process clause was provided by the Court.
Despite the cryptic nature of the opinion, the decision in Cha-
vez clearly recognized that in interrogation contexts, there are two
relevant due process “clauses” contained in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.  First, there is the concern for “procedural” due process — a
concern that the suspect receives a fair trial.108  As previously dis-
cussed, this appears to be the initial focus of the due process clause
— the prohibition against coerced confessions was very much
grounded in a concern about reliability, and hence, a concern
about the right to a fair trial.  Even when the focus shifted away
from reliability, the due process clause remained grounded in the
notion that a coerced confession cannot be used to convict a defen-
106. Chavez v. Martinez, 583 U.S. 760 (2003).
107. Id. at 4392.
108. See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 237 (1940) (“[T]he due process provi-
sion of the Fourteenth Amendment — just like as that in the Fifth — has led few to
doubt that it was intended to guarantee procedural standards adequate and appropri-
ate, then and thereafter, to protect, at all times, people charged with or suspected of
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dant: “[the due process clause] prevent[s] fundamental unfairness
in the use of evidence, whether true or false.”109  In sum, to the
extent the Fourteenth Amendment focuses on procedural fairness,
an attempt to introduce the evidence against a suspect at trial is
obviously required.
Second, the Court in Chavez affirmed that there is a “substan-
tive” due process right to be free of coercive interrogation tactics
regardless of how any procured statements are used.  Indeed, eight
justices affirmed that a person has a right to be free from coercive
interrogation tactics whether or not any procured statements are
used against him.110  In other words, independent from its concern
with a fair trial due process is concerned with placing appropriate
limits on police behavior and with respecting an individual’s dignity
and autonomy.  As even the Brief for the Petitioner in Martinez con-
ceded, “substantive due process jurisprudence is broad enough to
condemn certain police questioning outright . . .”111
The question, obviously, is how to define the substantive right.
The Court made little attempt to do so in Chavez v. Martinez, instead
choosing to remand the case for further determination.  Thus, the
Ninth Circuit presumably will need to develop standards for assess-
ing the nature of due process in this context.
Defining substantive due process is not easy.  The amorphous
nature of substantive due process has bedeviled the judiciary — and
scholars — throughout the century.112  Two formulations of sub-
stantive due process that have developed over time, however, seem
most relevant in the area of police interrogations.  First, the due
process clause protects against behavior that “shocks the con-
science,” or that contravenes our conceptions of a democratic, de-
109. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941); see also Malinski v. New York,
324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945).
110. Justice O’Connor never weighed in on this issue.
111. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 91, at 28 (substantive due process violated by
police questioning this is intentional, brutal and unjustified by legitimate state interest);
see also Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Criminal Justice Foundation in Support of Peti-
tioner, Chavez v. Martinez, No. 01-1444, at 28 2003 U.S. LEXIS 4274 (2002) (“Force,
the threat of force, or the deprivation of food, water or sleep during interrogation vio-
lates substantive due process.”).
112. See Flores, 507 U.S. at 301; see also Adam B. Wolf, Fundamentally Flawed:  Tradi-
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cent society.113  Second, due process protects those rights deeply
rooted in the nation’s history and tradition.114
To hold that the due process clause prohibits police behavior
that “shocks the conscience” in many ways merely restates the ques-
tion.  How do we determine what behavior is so shocking?  Some
would say that any police coercion that overbears the will of the
suspect is unconscionable; others would require extreme police
brutality.  My point is not to conclusively enter this field — that
would be an article in itself.  Rather, my point is simply this: how-
ever the substantive due process right is defined, much of what we
think of as “torture” would clearly constitute behavior that “shocks
the conscience.”
113. See Deshawn E v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 348 (2d Cir. 1998) (under Section 1983,
the “challenged conduct must be the kind of misbehavior that so shocks the sensibilities
of civilized society as to warrant a federal intrusion into the criminal processes of the
state.”).
The shock the conscience approach was used since the early 1900’s to determine
whether a contract should be enforced, or whether to accept a sale of property. See Eric
Muller, Constitutional Conscience, at 5-6 (2002) (Unpublished manuscript).  The test was
first used in a criminal context in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). See
infra notes 118-122 and accompanying text; see also Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516
(1884), where the defendant in a murder case claimed that the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment required that all criminal cases be initiated by a grand jury
indictment.  Court rejected that notion, but held that due process protects those “fun-
damental principles of liberty and justice that lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions.” Id. at 534-35.
The “shock the conscience” approach has been subjected to much criticism.  For
example, Professor Benner argues that the shock the conscience standard is “unable to
provide a theoretical framework capable of generating neutral principles that transcend
the result in the immediate case at hand.”  Thus, the approach “ransoms due process to
the personal values of five members of the Court.”  Laurence Benner, Requiem for Mi-
randa:  The Rehnquist Court’s Voluntariness Doctrine Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L.Q.
59, 131 (1989); see also, Rochin, 342 U.S. at 175 (Black, J., concurring) (criticizing
court’s doctrine as unprincipled, bounded by nothing except a judge’s personal notion
of civilized decencies”); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 861 (1998)
(Scalia, J., concurring)(calling shock the conscience test “the cellophane of
subjectivity”).
114. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) (“[A]ppropriate
limits on substantive due process come . . . from careful respect for the teachings of
history’ [and] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society.”)(citations
omitted); accord, Washington v. Glucksberg, 523 U.S. 702 (1987); Michael H. v. Gerald
D, 491 U.S. 110 (1989); see also Rebecca Brown, Traditional Insight, 103 YALE L. J. 177,
201 (1993) (discussing use of history and tradition); Wolf, supra note 112 (“history and
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Indeed, in many ways, the “shock the conscience” test may be
at the core of defining torture and distinguishing it from other be-
haviors.  For example, a police officer striking a suspect might be
illegal, or at least offensive, but few would feel it constitutes “tor-
ture.”  Why?  Such conduct can be characterized as the deliberate
imposition of physical pain to elicit information.  Yet, because the
behavior is not likely to be deemed “so egregious, so outrageous
that it fairly [can] be said to shock the contemporary con-
science,”115 it would neither violate the due process clause nor con-
stitute torture.
Sustained, brutal beating, however, that crosses over some
threshold of brutality — that begins to shock us with its brutality and
degradation for humanness — goes beyond mere abuse.  It may
deserve condemnation as a method of torture rather than merely
offensive behavior.116 Rochin v. California is instructive in this re-
gard, as it provides an example of police conduct that crosses the
brutality threshold.117
In Rochin, several deputy sheriffs, having information that
Antonio Rochin was in possession of narcotics, forced themselves
into his bedroom.  After an officer pointed to two pills on his night-
stand and asked him to whom they belonged, Rochin swallowed the
capsules.  An officer squeezed Rochin’s throat and forced his fin-
gers down his mouth, but to no avail.118The officers then took
Rochin to the hospital where, at the direction of the police, the
doctors strapped him to a gurney, and forced a tube into his mouth
and down his throat.  After an emetic solution was administered
down the tube, Rochin vomited into a bucket.  The capsules were
115. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848 n.8 (1998).
116. The Seventh Circuit made this point in Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190 (7th Cir.
1989).  There, the suspect sought damages from the FBI agents who, he claimed, held a
pistol at his temple during his interrogation.  In remanding for consideration under the
due process clause, the court noted: “this is not to suggest that the federal courts should
monitor the details of police interrogation and to award damages whenever the police
cross the line that separates coercive from non-coercive interrogation.  The relevant
liberty is not freedom from unlawful interrogation but freedom from severe body or
mental harm . . . We do not specify a particular threshold . . . But it is a high threshold,
and to cross it [plaintiffs] must show misconduct that a reasonable person would find so
beyond the norm of proper police procedure as to shock the conscience.” Id. at 195.
117. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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retrieved from the bucket, and were found to be morphine.
Rochin was convicted of unlawful possession of morphine based on
the admission of the pills against him at trial.119
The Supreme Court reversed Rochin’s conviction, holding the
retrieval of the morphine tablets and their use at trial, shocked the
conscience and hence violated Rochin’s due process rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment.  “The proceedings by which the con-
viction was obtained do more than offend some fastidious squea-
mishness or private sentimentalism about combating crime too
energetically . . . .They are methods too close to the rack and the
screw to permit of constitutional differentiation.”120
In addition to the “shock the conscience” test, substantive
rights are also defined as those “deeply rooted in this Nation’s his-
tory and tradition.”121  In Washington v. Glucksberg,122 the Supreme
Court, expressing a general reluctance to expand the concept of
119. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 166-67.
120. Id. at 172; see also Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 133 (1954) (Court makes
clear that what was so troubling in Rochin was the physical brutality there); Muller,
supra note 113, at 27.
121. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
122. See id.  Like the “shock the conscience” test, the use of history and tradition
has also been widely criticized as subjective and malleable. See generally LAURENCE TRIBE
& MICHAEL DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 106 (1991); Wolf, supra note 112.
Many argue that history and tradition can be molded to support almost any conclusion
depending on the historical period looked at and the level of specificity with which the
tradition is framed. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n. 6 (1989 (discuss-
ing the level of specificity issue); see also, Laurence Tribe & Michael Dorf, Levels of Gener-
ality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057 (1990); David Crump, How do
Courts Discover Unenumerated Fundamental Rights? Cataloguing the Methods of Judicial Al-
chemy, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 795 (1996).  For example, one could make the argu-
ment that there is a long tradition of using torture and coercion throughout Anglo-
American history. See H. Richard Uviller, Evidence from the Mind of the Criminal Suspect:  A
Reconsideration of the Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1140
(1989) (discussing Anglo-American history of torture from the 13th Century); Andrea
Montavon-McKillip, CAT among Pigeons: The Convention against Torture, A Precarious Inter-
section Among International Human Rights Law and U.S. Immigration Law, 44 ARIZ L. REV.
247, 248 (2002) (despite early condemnation of torture, it was revenant after World
War Two; torture was again used by European colonialists, British anti-terrorist forces in
Northern Ireland, the Greek military, Latin American military dictatorships, African
dictators, communist regimes, and United States police departments, to name a few.”).
Others applaud the use of history and tradition in defining substantive due process
rights.  Professor Muller, for example, praises it as a “palatable way of converting the
shocks the conscience test from free-form philosophy to constitutional principle.”
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substantive due process, held that it would only protect under the
due process clause “those fundamental rights and liberties which
are, objectively, deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition,
and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”  Does torture
violate any fundamental rights that are deeply rooted in this na-
tion’s history?
The right to be free from extreme physical brutality during po-
lice questioning seems so rooted.  There clearly is a liberty interest
in bodily integrity that would protect against physical abuse during
interrogation.123  Indeed, there is a long history of condemnation
of physical torture and the freedom from such abuse seems implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty.  Thus, most would agree with the
Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that the substantive due process right
under the Fourteenth Amendment includes “freedom from severe
bodily or mental harm inflicted in the course of an interroga-
tion.”124  Or, as Justice Kennedy wrote in Chavez, “it seems to me a
simple enough matter to say that use of torture or its equivalent in
an attempt to induce a statement violates an individual’s fundamen-
tal right to liberty . . . .  The Constitution does not countenance the
official imposition of severe pain or pressure for purposes of inter-
rogation . . .”125
So, my point is simply this: there seems significant agreement
that, whatever the precise scope of the due process clause, it does
limit certain police behavior regardless of any desire or attempt to
admit evidence in a criminal trial.  Even those who would attempt
to define the scope of the due process clause narrowly concede that
extreme acts of physical or mental abuse would likely cross the line
into unconstitutional behavior.126
Nonetheless, this does not mean that all forms of coercive
questioning of terrorists will violate due process.  First, what might
123. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); see also
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
124. Wilkins v. May, 877 F.2d 190, 195 (7th Cir. 1989); see also, Palko v. Connecti-
cut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (overruled on other grounds by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784 (1969) (due process must at least give “protection against torture, physical or
mental.”)).
125. Chavez, 583 U.S. 760 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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constitute a substantive due process violation likely will be strictly
construed because courts have been reluctant to add new substan-
tive rights.127  Most courts have found that the infliction of minimal
physical abuse does not constitute a substantive due process viola-
tion.  For example, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
found no due process violation when officers threatened to knock
out a suspect’s teeth if he remained silent.128  The court concluded
that the officers’ conduct, while not to be condoned, did not “rise
to the level of a brutal and wanton act of cruelty.”129
Likewise, psychological ploys such as keeping the lights on,
continuous interrogations, and sleep deprivation would often not
rise to the level of shocking the conscience, or be contrary to a right
long protected by history and tradition, and therefore, are not
likely to constitute a substantive due process violation.130  Even
though confessions elicited by these tactics have been excluded
from trial as “involuntary,” this does not necessarily mean that there
was a substantive due process violation.  As Professor Susan Klein
recognized, “the standard for finding a confession to be involuntary
is much lower than the ‘shock the conscience’ substantive due pro-
cess standard.”131
Finally, it is likely that the use of truth serum in extreme cir-
cumstances would not violate substantive due process rights.  In
other words, while any statements derived from the administration
of truth serum could not be introduced at trial — that would vio-
late procedural due process concerns — the procurement of such
statements would not otherwise violate due process.  The courts
127. The Supreme Court itself has expressed an unwillingness to recognize new
substantive rights, and has indicated that it will construe existing rights narrowly.  As the
Court said in Washington v. Glucksberg, “we have always been reluctant to expand the
concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decision-making
in this un-chartered area are scarce and open ended.”  521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); accord,
Collins v. Harkin Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992).
128. Hopson v. Fredericksen, 961 F.2d 1374, 1379 n.3 (8th Cir. 1992).
129. Id.; accord Robertson v. Plano, 70 F.3d 21 (5th Cir. 1995).
130. See Richard Posner, supra note 17 (truth serum, bright lights and sleep depri-
vation more aptly described as coercion rather than torture).
131. Susan R. Klein, Miranda Deconstitutionalized: When the Self-Incrimination Clause
and the Civil Rights Act Collide, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 417, 471 (1994).  As Professor Klein
argued, if all involuntary confessions violated substantive due process, it would provide
insufficient guidelines to the police, who might cease all custodial interrogation rather
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would not likely find that the injection of “truth serum,” which is
minimally invasive, involves almost no pain or deleterious side ef-
fects, and simply lowers inhibitions, constitutes severe bodily intru-
sion or shocks the conscience.  This conclusion is bolstered by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Breuthaupt v. Abrams.132  There, an
emergency room doctor, at the behest of the police, drew blood in
order to determine the blood alcohol content of an unconscious
driver who had caused an accident, killing three people.  The driver
argued that this invasion violated his due process rights under
Rochin.  The Court disagreed, noting that there was “nothing brutal
or offensive in the taking of a sample of blood when done . . . under
the protective eye of a physician.”133
Thus, there are methods of interrogation that may be associ-
ated with the word “torture” that might not raise substantive due
process concerns.  But what if a prisoner is impervious to other
physical or psychological tactics, and the only method left to at-
tempt to obtain information is to use electrodes attached to the
genitals.  At a threshold level, this infliction of significant physical
pain and suffering would clearly raise concerns under due process.
Does this mean that such a tactic is constitutionally impermissible?
132. 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
133. Id. at 435; see also People v. Melton, 44 Cal. 3d 713, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 934
(1988) (calling a blood test a “minimal intrusion.”).
There potentially may be a Fourth Amendment violation with the use of truth se-
rum injections.  The Supreme Court has held in the context of blood tests for drug
testing that both the physical invasion of the skin, and the analyzing of that blood sam-
ple which might yield private information, constitute a search under the Fourth
Amendment. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).  The
Fourth Amendment, however, does not prohibit such a search; it merely requires that it
be reasonable.  Thus, at worst, the use of truth serum might require that the officers
obtain a search warrant based upon probable cause to believe the individual has rele-
vant information.  It is very possible, however, that the Court would not even require a
warrant, and would simply demand that the search be reasonable. In cases of special
government need beyond the normal requirements of law enforcement, the Court has
held that a warrant and even any individualized suspicion may be dispensed with. See
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000); see also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619-20
(discussing doctrine of special needs).
The pin-prick involved in delivering the “truth serum” is likely to be viewed as a
minimal intrusion involving virtually no risk, trauma or pain, and thus could be justified
without probable cause or a warrant in the face of special government need beyond the
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The answer must be no.  The conclusion that a constitutional
right has been violated does not end with a finding that the police
behavior shocks the conscience.  Rather, the analysis only begins
there.  The Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee that the govern-
ment will not deprive any person of due process of law, like virtually
all constitutional provisions, is not absolute.  The government may
deprive a person of life, liberty or property if the government has a
sufficiently valid justification for doing so.134
Therefore, methods of interrogation that normally would not
be tolerated in a free society nonetheless might be constitutionally
permissible if there is a compelling government interest that out-
weighs an individual’s rights.135  Or, to look at the issue from a
slightly different perspective — a conclusion that certain behavior
should not be tolerated in a free society can not be made simply by
considering the government’s behavior in isolation — the entire
context must be evaluated.  For example, a situation in which bam-
boo shoots are forced under a petty theft’s fingernails to find the
location of stolen videos may be deemed intolerable.  However,
such action may be deemed acceptable when dealing with a terror-
ist who admits to planting a weapon of mass destruction in a largely
populated city and refuses to say where.  In other words, police be-
havior that may be condemned as indecent and abhorrent to civi-
lized society in one circumstance may be reluctantly embraced as a
necessary evil in another.136  Due process does not exist in a vac-
134. “If a right is deemed fundamental [under the due process clause], the Govern-
ment must present a compelling interest to justify an infringement.  Alternatively, if a
right is not fundamental, only a legitimate purpose is required for the law to be sus-
tained.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 700 (2d ed. 2001); cf. New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (recognizing exception to Miranda because of counter-
vailing public safety need); McNally v. Butts, 195 F.3d 1039, 1042 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1999)
(suggesting different result if there were exigent circumstances such as a ticking bomb
that had to be located).
135. As will be discussed more fully below, whether the government has a compel-
ling interest in obtaining the information must also include consideration of the socie-
tal costs of utilizing coercion. See Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1250 (the government interest
must also include societal interest in freedom from coercion and in fairness in police
procedure).
136. Cf. Haynes v.  Washington 373 U.S. 503, 519 (1963) (“The procedures here
are no less constitutionally impermissible and perhaps more unwarranted because so
unnecessary.  There is no reasonable or rational basis for claiming that the oppressive
and unfair methods (of interrogation) utilized were in any way essential to the detec-
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uum, and requires consideration of any compelling government in-
terest as well as any alternative means to secure those interests.
Thus far, the Supreme Court has not undertaken such a bal-
ancing approach in evaluating the due process rights of an interro-
gated suspect.137  In the only known case of this sort, a Florida State
court obliquely considered the question of whether the use of ex-
treme force is acceptable when a suspect has information vital to
someone’s life.  In that case, the police encountered a kidnapper,
Jean Leon, during a prearranged meeting to collect ransom.138
Forced to take Leon into custody, the police demanded that he tell
them where the victim was being held.139  Leon refused to reveal
the information.  The police officers, fearing that the victim’s life
was in imminent danger because Leon could not return to his asso-
ciate with the ransom, proceeded to threaten and physically abuse
Leon by twisting his arm behind his back and choking him until he
revealed where the victim was being held.  The police then went to
the location, rescued the victim and arrested the confederate.  Sev-
eral hours after his arrest, at a different location than the earlier
“interrogation,” different police officers questioned Leon after in-
forming him of his right to remain silent, and he provided a full
confession.  It is that confession that Leon was seeking to suppress
— the state was not seeking to admit the initial information regard-
ing the location of the kidnap victim.140
137. It has in the area of “Miranda” violations under the Fifth Amendment, where
the Supreme Court adopted a “public safety” exception. See infra note 148 and accom-
panying text.
138. Leon v. State, 410 So. 2d 201 (Fl. Ct. App. 1982), aff’d Leon v. Wainwright, 734
F2d 770 (11th Cir. 1984).  The Court of Appeals similarly found it important to men-
tion that the “violence was not inflicted to obtain a confession or provide other evi-
dence to establish appellant’s guilt. Instead, it was motivated by the immediate necessity
to find the victim and save his life.” Id. at 773 n.5; see also supra notes 12-13 and accom-
panying text.
139. The kidnapper was actually meeting with the brother of the person kidnapped
to claim the ransom, the police were watching nearby.  When the kidnapper drew a gun
on the brother, the police were forced to intervene and arrest the kidnapper. Leon, 410
So. 2d. at 202.
140. The issue in this case was the admissibility of the later, station house confes-
sion and whether it was tainted by the admittedly coerced confession.  The court held
that that second confession was admissible because of the intervening events.  Such
intervening events included the time between the interrogations, the different locations
and different officers at the station house than in the field.  Most significant, the court
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Although the court was not directly concerned with whether
the police officer’s behavior in eliciting the first “confession” was
constitutional or not, the court did comment on the officer’s ac-
tions, intimating that the physical abuse of Leon did not violate
standards of decency.  The court noted, “the force and threats as-
serted upon Leon in the parking lot were understandably motivated
by the immediate necessity to find the victim and save his life.  Un-
like the situation in every authority cited by the defendant . . . the
violence was not inflicted in order to secure a confession or provide
other evidence to establish the defendant’s guilt.”141  In a footnote,
however, the court backtracked, noting that since it really was irrel-
evant to the resolution of the case, “we do not attempt to resolve
the moral and philosophical problem of whether the force used on
Leon in the emergency, life-threatening situation presented to the
arresting officers, was “justified” or proper.”142  It is interesting that
the court viewed this question as a moral and philosophical one,
rather than a legal issue.
The bottom line appears to be that no court, thus far, has en-
gaged in a substantive due process analysis in which the justification
for the state’s behavior was considered in assessing the voluntari-
ness of a confession.  Such an analysis, however, is essential to deter-
mining whether torture violates the due process clause.  Assessing
whether police conduct exceeds the bounds of acceptable behavior,
or whether an action shocks the conscience, requires consideration
of justifications for such action.  The context in which some have
suggested that torture is appropriate — the ticking bomb scenario
— in which police use torture to obtain information to save
thousands, perhaps millions of lives, demands scrutiny of govern-
ment interests.
The nature of government interests figures into the constitu-
tional analysis in two distinct ways.  First, the government’s pur-
ported justification for torturing will invariably factor into the
consideration of whether the police conduct shocks the conscience.
Police abuse intended simply to injure without any other justifica-
later confession because the police officers acted that way in the field in order to find
the victim; once the victim was saved, the suspect would realize that there was no reason
for him to fear abuse.  Id. at 202-03.
141. Id. at 203 (emphasis supplied).
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tion is the “sort of official action most likely to rise to the con-
science-shocking level.”143  Even despicable police behavior,
however, might not shock the conscience if essential for saving tens
of thousands of lives, or, even if shocking, might nonetheless be
found constitutional based on such a compelling government
interest.144
Second, in considering any possibly compelling government
interest for engaging in torture, it is not only the possibility of sav-
ing lives if a terrorist attack were thwarted that must be evaluated.
The government interest must also include institutional concerns
against using torture, as well as considerations of the effectiveness
of the tactic.145  These concerns are addressed in Section III.
B. The Right Against Self-Incrimination, Miranda Rights
and Limits on Torture
Until the 1960’s, the law regarding confessions was governed
almost exclusively by the doctrine of voluntariness under the due
process clause.146  But the Court was concerned that the Four-
teenth Amendment’s amorphous standards could not adequately
protect criminal suspects from police coercion.  Central to this con-
cern was the fact that interrogation was still a practice conducted
almost entirely under police control, with a suspect not only iso-
lated from external sources of support, but also subject to a wide
variety of tactics designed to “persuade, trick or cajole”147 a
confession.
143. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998).  Thus, physical
abuse undertaken for sadistic purposes may violate substantive due process; the exact
same behavior when done to obtain the location of a “dirty” bomb may not.
144. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982) (must balance individual
liberty interest against government’s interest in determining whether there is a substan-
tive due process violation).
145. See Cooper, 963 F.3d at 1250 (conception of common good cannot only include
possibility of catching criminal; it must also include the importance of fairness in police
procedures and the common good in freedom from coercion).
146. In 1897, the Supreme Court in Bram v. United States held that an involuntary
confession elicited pre-trial is inadmissible under the Fifth Amendment’s privilege
against self-incrimination.  But after Bram, the Court basically ignored the self-incrimi-
nation clause as a basis for finding confession inadmissible and focused instead on the
due process clause.
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In order to better protect against involuntary confessions, the
Court shifted its focus from the Fourteenth Amendment’s due pro-
cess protections to the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-in-
crimination.148  The Fifth Amendment provides that “no person . . .
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
148. One of the most significant developments under the Fifth Amendment was
the holding in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  Finding that police domi-
nated, custodial interrogations were presumptively coercive, and hence, potentially vio-
lative of the right against self-incrimination, the Court took a proactive approach to
protecting a suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights.  A suspect in custody subjected to inter-
rogation must be afforded certain rights, and must be told of these rights.  Specifically,
these Miranda rights require that the police warn a suspect that he has the right to
remain silent, and the right to have an attorney present during questioning.  Any waiver
of these rights must be made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.  See generally
Marcy Strauss, Reinterrogation, HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 359 (1995).
It is entirely possible that the police may violate a suspect’s Miranda rights during
questioning of a terrorist.  However, the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized a
public safety exception to Miranda in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).  There,
a young woman approached two officers, and told them that she had just been raped.
She described the offender, and told the police that he was armed, and that he had just
entered a nearby grocery store.  The officers went to the store, found the suspect and
frisked him.  They found an empty shoulder holster, but no gun.  Without reading him
his rights, one police officer asked him where the gun was and Quarles told him “the
gun is over there.” Id. at 651-52.  The police retrieved a loaded .38 caliber revolver
from the place Quarles indicated.
At trial, the court suppressed the statement “the gun is over there” and the gun
itself as fruit of a Miranda violation; the court of appeals affirmed. Id. at 653.  The
Supreme Court reversed, finding that there was a “public safety exception to the re-
quirement that Miranda warning be given before a suspect’s answers may be admitted.
Miranda need not be applied “with all its rigor to a situation in which police officers ask
questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety.” Id. at 656.
Given the context in which torture is suggested, it is clear that a public safety ex-
ception to Miranda would justify dispensing with the Miranda rights.  There is a compli-
cation, however: Quarles was based in significant part on the assumption that a Miranda
violation did not constitute a constitutional violation.  That is, a statement may be elic-
ited in violation of Miranda, but otherwise not be coerced, and thus it does not violate
the Fifth Amendment.  The Supreme Court has recently rejected the notion that a Mi-
randa violation is not a constitutional violation. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S.
428 (2000).  The Supreme Court has not decided the implications of this holding for
the public safety exception. But see United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013(10th Cir.
2002) (decision in Dickerson establishes that Miranda is a constitutional rule, and
hence, physical evidence obtained by police as a result of a statement obtained in viola-
tion of Miranda must be suppressed).
In any event, whether the argument is that there was a Miranda violation, or an
independent Fifth Amendment violation during the interrogation process, the ultimate
question remains the same:  Does the Fifth Amendment (and Miranda) apply when the
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self.”149  Although read literally, the language of the Fifth Amend-
ment suggests that the privilege only protects a suspect from being
forced to testify against himself in a criminal trial, the Supreme
Court has long provided a much broader interpretation of the
Amendment.150  Although how broadly the Amendment sweeps is a
matter of significant dispute,151 no one doubts that the Fifth
Amendment applies to exclude, from a criminal trial, coerced state-
ments elicited during police interrogation.  Thus, it is established
that any confession coerced out of a suspect would be inadmissible
at a criminal trial.152
As with the due process analysis, those who advocate the lim-
ited use of torture would not challenge the inadmissibility of co-
erced testimony at trial because of the right against compelled self-
incrimination.  The issue, then, is whether the Fifth Amendment
prohibits coercive interrogation tactics in the first place.  More suc-
cinctly — does the Fifth Amendment bar coercive questioning —
or only the admission of the fruits of such questioning in a criminal
trial against the accused?
The Supreme Court addressed this precise question in Chavez
v. Martinez.  The Court’s decision, however, provides little resolu-
tion.  First, there is some disagreement as to the actual holding in
Chavez.  Justice Thomas, announcing the judgment of the Court,
found that the Fifth Amendment privilege is a fundamental trial
right:
149. U.S. CONST. AMEND V.  The Fifth Amendment applies the privilege against self-
incrimination to the federal government; the Fourteenth Amendment ensures that the
states honor the privilege as part of due process.  In this section of the paper, the Fifth
Amendment will be used generically to refer to both constitutional provisions.
150. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
151. The precise scope of the Amendment has been subject to much debate; as one
legal scholar wrote, “[d]espite the facial clarity of this language, the amendment . . .
[has] always been shrouded in controversy.”  Marvin Schiller, On the Jurisprudence of the
Fifth Amendment Right to Silence, 16 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 197, 197 (1979); see also Akhil Reed
Amar and Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self Incrimination Clause,
93 MICH. L. REV 857, 857 (1995); Marcy Strauss, Silence, 35 LOY. L. REV. 101, 152 (2001).
152. See infra note 161.  The Ninth Circuit, however, appears to be in the minority
of those courts of appeals that have considered this issue. See, e.g., Riley v. Dorton, 115
F.3d 1159, 1164 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc); United States v. Paloma, 80 F.3d 138, 142
(5th Cir. 1996); Wiley v. Doory, 14 F.3d 993, 996 (4th Cir. 1994); Giuffre v. Bissell, 31
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Although our cases have permitted the Fifth Amend-
ment’s self-incrimination privilege to be asserted in non-
criminal cases — that does not alter our conclusion that a
violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimina-
tion occurs only if one has been compelled to be a witness
against himself in a criminal case.153
Coercive police questioning does not meet this standard.  As
Justice Thomas concluded:
In our view, the criminal case at the very least requires the
initiation of legal proceedings . . . . We need not decide
today the precise moment when a “criminal case” com-
mences, it is enough to say that police questioning does
not constitute a “case” any more than a private investiga-
tor’s pre-complaint activities constitute a civil case.154
For Justice Thomas, the only appropriate remedy for police
misconduct, including torture, lies, if at all, under the due process
clause:
Our views on the proper scope of the Fifth Amendment’s
Self-Incrimination Clause do not mean that police torture
that results in a confession is constitutionally permissible
so long as the statements are not used at trial; it simply
means that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, rather than the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimi-
nation Clause, would govern the inquiry in those cases
and provide relief in appropriate circumstances.155
Justice Thomas was joined, in this part of the opinion, by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and Scalia.  Numerous
commentators, and even Justice Kennedy, refer to these views as
being the majority holding of the decision even though, in actual-
ity, the opinion of the court was only a plurality.156  For example,
Justice Kennedy states: “In my view the Self-Incrimination Clause is
applicable at the time and place police use compulsion to extract a
153. Chavez, 583 U.S. at 768-69.
154. Id. at 767.
155. Id. at 770.
156. See, e.g., Gerald Plessner, Miranda Law Eroded in California Case, DAILY NEWS,
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statement from a suspect.  The Clause forbids that conduct.  A ma-
jority of the Court has now concluded otherwise. . ..”157
This inconsistency stems from the fact that Justices Souter and
Breyer concurred in the judgment — i.e., finding that Martinez had
no claim under 42 U.S.C. S. 1983 — not in Justice Thomas’ opinion.
Justices Souter and Breyer appeared to recognize the existence of a
right against compelled self-incrimination outside of a criminal trial
because they listed several examples of when such a right might be
asserted separate from trial.  Their concern, however, was with rec-
ognizing a civil damage remedy to enforce that right:
The most obvious drawback inherent in Martinez’s purely
Fifth Amendment claim to damages is its risk of global
application in every instance of interrogation producing a
statement inadmissible under Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment principles . . . If obtaining Martinez’ state-
ment is to be treated as a stand alone violation of the priv-
ilege subject to compensation, why should the same not
be true whenever the police obtain any involuntary self
incriminating statements or whenever the government so
much as threatens a penalty in derogation of the right to
immunity, or whenever the police fail to honor Miranda?
Martinez offers no limiting principle or reason to foresee a
stopping place short of liability in all such cases.158
While there were 6 votes to deny Martinez’s claim, there was no
definitive determination of the scope of the Fifth Amendment
outside the trial context.  Indeed, if Justice Souter’s opinion is read
as recognizing some Fifth Amendment right outside of the criminal
trial, even though there is no damage remedy, then there are five
justices who might find that the privilege against self-incrimination
could be violated by torture.  Professor Chemerinsky argues that
the real majority holding in Martinez is simply that “there is not a
civil cause of action for questioning in violation of Miranda v. Ari-
zona,” rather than a broad statement on the reach of the privilege
against self-incrimination.159
157. Chavez, 538 U.S. at 768.
158. 538 U.S. 764.
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Because Chavez v. Martinez failed to resolve the application of
the Fifth Amendment to police questioning when no statement is
utilized at a criminal prosecution, both sides of the debate merit
consideration.  Those who argue that the privilege against self-in-
crimination prohibits coercive police behavior, argue that the Fifth
Amendment’s policies require an expansive view of the right.  As
one scholar noted, the Amendment was “adopted in response to a
long history of oppression of the individual by the state and . . . [is]
an important shield, protecting individuals against abuses of state
authority.”160  It is viewed as “one of the great landmarks in man’s
struggle to make himself civilized.”161  From the earliest times, the
Court has recognized a lengthy list of critical values the Amend-
ment is to serve — values that extend far beyond the introduction
of evidence in a criminal case.  For example, the Supreme Court in
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor set forth the fol-
lowing policies furthered by the privilege:
The privilege against self incrimination reflects many of
our fundamental values and most noble aspirations:  our
unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the
cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt;
our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisi-
torial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incrimi-
nating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment
and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates a fair
state-individual balance by requiring the government to
leave the individual alone until good case is shown for dis-
turbing him and by requiring the government in its con-
test with the individual to shoulder the entire load . . . our
respect for the inviolability of the human personality and
the right of each individual to a private enclave where he
may lead a private life; . . . our distrust of self-deprecatory
statements; and our realization that the privilege, while
sometimes a shelter to the guilty, is often a protection to
the innocent.162
160. Mary Shein, The Privilege Against Self Incrimination Under Seige: Asherman v.
Meachum, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 503, 505 (1993).
161. E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955).
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These values, and the protections afforded by the Fifth Amend-
ment, are not implicated only by the use of evidence at trial.  More
specifically, the inviolability of the human personality, and the right
of each person to a “private enclave,” are jeopardized by coercive
police interrogation tactics, even if any information obtained is
never used against the suspect in a criminal trial.
Moreover, advocates for a broad view of the right against self-
incrimination argue that the Fifth Amendment should apply
outside the trial setting, and indeed, that the Supreme Court has so
held.163  In United States v. Hubbell,164 the Supreme Court found that
the Fifth Amendment was violated outside of a trial setting when it
affirmed the dismissal of an indictment on the ground that the gov-
ernment used an immunized act of producing documents to obtain
the indictment.165  The Court recognized that the phrase “in any
criminal case” in the Fifth Amendment
might have been read to limit its coverage to compelled
testimony that is used against the defendant in the trial
itself.  It has, however, long been settled that its protec-
tion encompasses compelled statements that lead to the
discovery of incriminating evidence even though the
statements themselves are not incriminating and are not
introduced into evidence.166
Under this broad view of the right against self-incrimination, the
use of torture against terrorists, even in the ticking bomb scenario
and even when the information is not used for prosecutorial pur-
poses, would certainly violate the Fifth Amendment.  It is hard to
imagine what could be more destructive of human dignity, or the
inviolability of the human personality, than the coercive tactics used
in torture.  Furthermore in analyzing the Fifth Amendment, courts
do not engage in balancing because there is no room to balance
any compelling government interest against the act of compulsion.
163. For an excellent defense of this position, see Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU and
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice in Support of Respondent Martinez, submitted
in Chavez v. Martinez, No. 01-1444 (2002).
164. 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
165. Id. at 41.
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On the other hand, some, like the plurality in Martinez, suggest
a Fifth Amendment violation occurs only when a suspect is incrimi-
nated at trial.  Proponents of this limited view of the Fifth Amend-
ment make three basic arguments.  First, the reach of the Fifth
Amendment is not co-extensive with the myriad of purposes often
asserted in support of the clause.  Second, the language of prior
Supreme Court decisions requires a reading of the Fifth Amend-
ment limiting it to an exclusionary rule.  And third, the doctrine of
immunity supports a narrow view of the right against self-
incrimination.
First, some argue that the broad policy justifications for the
right against self-incrimination cannot expand the scope of the
privilege.  Indeed, the litany of broadly defined policy justifications
in Murphy has been discredited.167  As the Supreme Court recently
held:
we think there would be sound reasons to stop short of
resting an expansion of the . . . [Fifth Amendment’s]
scope on the highly general statements of policy ex-
pressed in . . . .Murphy.  While its list does indeed catalog
aspirations furthered by the Clause, its discussion does
not even purport to weigh the host of competing policy
concerns that would be raised in a legitimate reconsidera-
tion of the Clause’s scope.168
Second, Supreme Court precedent has consistently implied
that the right against self-incrimination is a trial right.  As the Court
recently recognized, “at [the heart of the Fifth Amendment] lies
the principle that the courts of a government from which a witness
may reasonably fear prosecution may not in fairness compel the wit-
ness to furnish testimonial evidence that may be used to prove his
guilt.”169  Indeed, in dicta, the Supreme Court has already explicitly
embraced this limited reading of the Fifth Amendment.  In United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,170 the Court noted, “[t]he privilege
against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment is a
fundamental trial right of criminal defendants.  Although conduct
167. See, e.g., Balsys v. United States, 524 U.S. 666, 687-88 (1999).
168. Id. at 691.
169. Id. at 683.
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by law enforcement officials prior to trial may ultimately impair that
right, a constitutional violation occurs only at trial.”171
Finally, proponents of this limited reading of the Fifth Amend-
ment point to immunity cases in support of their position.  If the
government offers witness immunity so that the threat of incrimina-
tion is removed, then the government can compel that witness to
testify.172  In Kastigar v. United States,173 the Supreme Court held
that a witness who was compelled to testify before a grand jury
under a grant of use immunity could not invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination.  As the Court concluded, use immunity is
sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of privilege because the
sole concern of the privilege “is to afford protection against being
forced to give testimony leading to the infliction of penalties affixed
to . . . .criminal acts.”174  The fact that compulsion may violate some
zones of privacy, or infringes on individual dignity or the inviolabil-
ity of the human personality, were obviously not relevant considera-
tions for the court.
There were four votes in Chavez for this narrow reading of the
Fifth Amendment.  If this view — that the privilege against self-in-
crimination is solely a trial right — were to gain majority support,
the implication for the torture debate is clear: there would be no
claim under the privilege against even the most abusive police in-
171. Id. at 264 (emphasis supplied); see also Hubbell v. United States, 530 U.S. 27
(2000) (consistent with such dicta).  In Hubbell, since the coerced statement led to state-
ments used at trial, it could be argued that there is where the violation became com-
plete.  Simply coercing the initial information, in other words, was not a Fifth
Amendment violation; if nothing else happened, the right against self-incrimination
would not have been impugned.
172. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 448-49 (1972).
173. Id. at 453.  A person may not claim the privilege against self-incrimination if
their testimony has been rendered non-incriminating by a grant of immunity from the
government. See Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).  There are two types of
immunity: (1) use and derivative use immunity; and (2) transactional immunity.  In use
and derivative use immunity, the government cannot introduce into evidence the testi-
mony that is specifically immunized, and any evidence derived therefrom.  Transac-
tional immunity is broader, prohibiting the government from prosecuting the
immunized individual for any activity mentioned in the immunized testimony. See gener-
ally Kastigar, 406 U.S. 441; New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979).
174. Id.; accord, Mark A. Godsey, Miranda’s Final Frontier- the International Arena: A
Critical Analysis of United States v. Bin Laden And A Proposal for a New Miranda Exception
Abroad, 51 DUKE L.J. 1703, 1724 (2002); Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to Disregard
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terrogation methods.  As Professor Mark Godsey concluded: “[I]f a
law enforcement officer were to use brute force and torture to ex-
tract an involuntary confession from a suspect, the officer would
not at that time have violated the privilege because the suspect
would not yet have testified against himself at trial.”175
In sum, the constitutional limitation on torture imposed by the
Fifth Amendment is as follows: If torture is used to extract admis-
sions used in a criminal prosecution, the right against self-incrimi-
nation is clearly violated, and the statements will be excluded.  If
torture is used solely for informational purposes, however, the re-
sult is not yet clear.  It is safe to say that at least four Justices clearly
believe that the use of torture to elicit information only for investi-
gative purposes does not violate the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.  Given the confusion in Chavez, however, I believe that the
definitive answer awaits another day.
C. International Law Limits on Torture
There is no doubt that international law prohibits the use of
torture.176  In numerous resolutions, including Article 5 of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,177 Article 7 of the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966,178 and,
most importantly, the United Nations Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment179 (hereinafter, “CAT”), the international community has
made clear its total disavowal of methods of torture.  These conven-
175. Godsey, supra note 174, at 1724.
176. See Francois Laracque, Opening Statement: The Choice of Torture, THE LAWYERS
WEEKLY, May 2, 2003 (among international crimes, torture is seen as one of the worst
possible violations of human dignity and bodily integrity).
177. G.A. Res. 217 A, 3 U.N. GAOR, Resolutions A/810, at 71.
178. 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
179. G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51 at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/
51 (Dec. 10, 1984).  For useful background information on the treaty, see J. HERMAN
BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A
HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION (1988).  CAT has been ratified by 118 state parties to
date.  The United States became a signatory in 1988, but did not deposit its instrument
of ratification with the U.N. until six years later.  “At this point, CAT became binding on
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tions, moreover, not only express utter disdain for torture, they ad-
mit of no exceptions to its prohibition.180
The United States has ratified these treaties, albeit with some
reservations.181  But the impact of these treaties on United States
interrogation tactics, frankly, is seemingly insignificant. Although
the treaties, and international law generally, establish important in-
ternational norms of conduct, there is no real enforcement.  CAT,
for example, requires the United States to submit reports to the
Committee Against Torture regarding its compliance with the
treaty.182  But the United States did not ratify the part of the Con-
vention asserting the United Nation’s authority to adjudicate cases
by individuals against signatory states.  Moreover, the United States
has refused to recognize the authority of international tribunals
over its actions.183  Thus, while CAT obviously has symbolic impor-
tance, and does provide relief from torture in other ways (i.e., for
refugees seeking asylum),184 it is not likely to be a significant factor
in deciding whether to use torture in an emergency situation.
D. Summary
A suspect’s due process rights and the privilege against self-
incrimination guaranteed under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amend-
ments clearly prohibit the government from engaging in torture for
180. See A GLIMPSE OF HELL: REPORTS ON TORTURE WORLDWIDE, ed by Duncan For-
rest for Amnesty International, 1996 at 8; Winfried Brugger, May Government Ever Use
Torture? Two Responses from German Law, 48 AM. J. COMP. LAW, 661, 672-73 (Fall 2000)(al-
though recognizing that international law is usually seen as absolute, suggests ways to
argue that it is not).
181. See supra note 44.
182. Montavon-McKillip, supra note 122, at 259.
183. Id. at 282 n.210.  “The United States routinely refuses to condone the enforce-
ability of whatever highly conditioned international human rights obligations it accepts.
In part it achieves this goal by reliance on an extraordinarily fungible notion that most
international rights are not ‘self-executing’ in consequence of which American courts
are precluded from implementing them.  Additionally, the United States refuses to al-
low its own citizens the right to access United Nations individualized complaint mecha-
nisms, including those established to. . .[ensure] freedom from torture.”  James C.
Hathaway & Anne K. Cusick, Refugee Rights are Not Negotiable, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 481,
481 (2000).
184. See David Weissbrodt & Isabel Hortreiter, The Principle of Non-Refoulement Article
3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or
Punishment in Comparison with the Non-Refoulement Provisions of other International Human
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the purpose of procuring evidence for prosecution.  While the self-
incrimination clause may or may not apply to torture if no evidence
is used against an accused, the due process clause almost certainly
does.  Although due process applies to torture in any circumstance,
whether that clause is ultimately violated if the government engages
in torture in exceptional circumstances requires further considera-
tion.  Since the right to due process is not absolute, the govern-
ment’s compelling need to engage in torture, as well as the costs of
such a policy, must be addressed.
III. THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE USE OF TORTURE:
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
As previously discussed, the government’s interest in permit-
ting torture should not only include the potential human lives
saved by forcing information out of a reluctant prisoner, but also
the harm that utilizing torture entails for the society that sanctions
such a tactic.  Those who reject the use of torture in any circum-
stance make three main arguments.  First, the use of torture is im-
moral and inconsistent with a democratic society, making us no
better than the terrorists we are trying to defeat.  Second, the use of
torture is ineffective and does not yield reliable information.  And
third, torture cannot be cabined into a narrow, specific usage and
inevitably would be resorted to in more and more situations.
A. A Philosophical Justification for Torture?
First, and perhaps most importantly, many argue that torture
simply is morally wrong, and therefore should never be employed,
no matter what.  Torture is evil.  The deliberate infliction of pain
and suffering by the state is “an abominable practice.”185  Even
those who recognize a justification for torture in certain circum-
stances concede that torture is a grievous wrong that can only be
outweighed by the greatest need.186
185. Sanford Kadish, Torture, the State and the Individual, 23 ISR. L. REV. 345, 352
(1989).
186. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 17, at 334 (“Torture is an evil, and is only eligible
to be justified when a greater evil is prevented.  Torture for its own sake or for retalia-
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Torture is evil not only because of what it does to those tor-
tured,187 but also because of the great cost it imposes on the tor-
turer and society itself.  The interrogator is corrupted; he learns to
treat suspects as objects, as subhuman.  Society suffers as well.
“When the state itself beats and extorts, it can no longer be said to
rest on foundations of morality and justice, but rather on force.
When a state [employs] torture, it reduces the moral distance be-
tween a government act and a criminal act.”188
Thus, the question is not whether torture is intrinsically wrong
— it is.189  The real issue is whether committing that wrong can
ever be morally justified.  Some scholars maintain that torture, al-
though a despicable practice must nonetheless be an available
weapon in the arsenal in the war on terrorism.  They argue that
torturing a suspect as a last resort, when there is no alternative and
when hundreds, thousands, potentially hundreds of thousands of
lives hang in the balance, is not morally bankrupt — it is the only
conclusion that makes sense.  As Professor Moore concludes:
[I]t just isn’t true that one should allow a nuclear war
rather than killing or torturing an innocent person.  It
isn’t even true that one should allow the destruction of a
sizable city by a terrorist devise rather than kill or torture
an innocent person.  To prevent such extraordinary
harms extreme actions seem to me to be to be justified.190
187. See Peters, supra note 17, at 179-80, 187 (discussing horrors of torture, and
quoting Francisco Campagnoni: “torture tends to the disintegration and consequent
annihilation of the psyche and moral personality, to the non-physical destruction, prac-
tically speaking, of the human person, with lasting results”).
188. Mordecai Kremnitzer, The Landau Commission Report:  Was the Security Service
Subordinated to the Law, or the Law to the Needs of the Security Service?, 23 ISR. L. REV. 216,
264 (1989); see also Peters, supra note 17, at 187 (“[I]f the victim is conceived to be
without human dignity and therefore vulnerable to torture, the torturer also divests
himself of human dignity.”); Henrik Hertzburg, Terror and Torture, THE NEW YORKER,
March 24, 2003, at 29 (“Torture is abhorrent not only for what it does to the tortured
but for what it makes of the torturer”).
189. See Donald A. Dripps, Evidence and Procedure for the Future: Self Incrimination and
Self Preservation:  A Skeptical View, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 329, 342 (asserting, without any
reservation, “[a]ll agree on prohibiting torture.”).  Of course, Professor Dripps’s article
was written ten years before September 11.
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How does one reach such conclusions?  There are two main
philosophical arguments that torture can be morally justified in or-
der to save lives.  First, torture is justified because the ends justify
the means.  And second, torture is justified as a form of self-
defense.
1. Do the Ends Justify the Means?
Some advocates of torture make a simple “ends justify the
means” argument.  In other words, a utilitarian calculation is made:
if more lives can be saved by torture than are harmed by it, the act
is justified.  And, in a normal utilitarian balancing process, the
value of the human dignity of a terrorist does not stand a chance
against the value of innocent human lives.191
An “ends justify the means” rationale, however, has never been
viewed as the basis of our justice system.  Many rules have been de-
veloped to precisely guard against such a philosophy.  For example,
evidence may be excluded from a trial even if it results in a guilty
person going free, perhaps causing great harm, if the means of ob-
taining that evidence is deemed unconstitutional.192
191. Kremnitzer, supra note 188, at 263.
192. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (the use of the exclusionary rule
in criminal procedure, where illegally obtained evidence is excluded in order to deter
police misconduct).  As Justice Clark noted, “the criminal goes free, if he must, but it is
the law that sets him free.  Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its
failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own exis-
tence.” Id. at 659. See also the behavior of the Los Angeles Police Department during
the so-called Rampart scandal in the 1990’s, where police officers planted evidence on
suspects very much on an “ends justify the means” rationale. See Erwin Chemerinsky,
An Independent Analysis of the Los Angeles Police Department’s Board of Inquiry Report on the
Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 545 (2001).
There is a doctrine in criminal law that seems to embrace a sort of  “ends justify the
means” mentality.  For example, a doctrine called the “lesser of evils” is a possible de-
fense to illegal conduct. Under that doctrine, conduct that an actor believes to be nec-
essary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable provided that the
harm to be avoided is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the
conduct as wrongful. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1984); see also United States
v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1992).  Thus, a prisoner may escape a burning prison,
and a person may destroy property to prevent the spread of fire.
Because the necessity defense is utilitarian, it is strictly construed.  Schoon, 971 F.2d
at 196.  It is not likely available in the torture context for three reasons.  First, to apply
the defense, there must be a clear choice of evils; it must be clear that an “alleged harm
will be abated in the taking of illegal action.”  Id. at 198.  It is not at all clear that torture
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There is good reason, moreover, for rejecting an “ends justify
the means” argument here.  First, using such an argument to justify
the torture of terrorists will cause our nation to lose the moral
“high-ground” in the war against terrorism.  Indeed, we would be
“lowering” ourselves to the same level as the terrorists if we were to
engage in state-sanctioned torture.  Terrorists typically inflict pain
and suffering upon others in order to achieve some ultimate end.
The argument underlying the terrorists’ actions is that the end
(often some political objective) justifies the means (killing whatever
number of innocent people).  Condemning terrorist behavior as
unacceptable and morally bankrupt requires us to reject “the ends
justify the means” rationale as a moral compass.  However laudable
the objective, it cannot be achieved at any price.
Engaging in torture, however, would strip us of this argu-
ment.193  As Professor Kremnitzer noted,
[T]he license to employ physical pressure in interroga-
tions constitutes a victory for terror, which has succeeded
in causing the State to stoop to quasi-terrorist methods.
The belief that the ends justifies the means, the willing-
ness to harm fundamental human values in order to at-
tain a goal . . . these are salient characteristics of terrorism
. . . An ever-present danger faced by a state confronted by
terrorism is that in the course of combating threats . . . its
character as a law-abiding state will suffer.194
Even if an “ends justify a means” analysis were employed,
whether saving lives actually justifies torture is a question that
should be seriously considered.  In other words, if one seriously
weighs the conflicting harms, it is not at all clear that the “ends
justify the means.”  First, the harms of torture to a suspect and the
state employing it would need to be considered.  And one should
tives militates against the defense.  There are a multitude of possible legal ways to inter-
rogate a prisoner, and to investigate a possible criminal threat.  Finally, the defense is
not available if the competing values had been resolved the deliberate legislative
choice.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1984).  Here, it can be argued that the interna-
tional denunciation of torture at all costs, as well as the internal condemnation, would
be analogous to such a deliberate legislative determination.
193. See Clarence Page, Confess. . . .or Else: Using Wicked Ways to Force Suspects to Talk,
CHI. TRIBUNE, Oct. 3, 2001, at 25.
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not assume that the saving of human lives would inherently out-
weigh or justify an interest in using immoral, degrading and unjust
methods to gain information.  Even if our nation’s physical security
were at stake, its moral security should matter.  As Professor Zamir
argues, “[n]ational security is not an end in itself . . . . If in the
course of the struggle for survival, we sacrifice the principles of lib-
erty, justice and peace on the altar of national security, no victory
can be more than delusory.  There is a form of survival which is not
worth the effort.”195
Moreover, the evil of accepting torture would have to be multi-
plied manifold in balancing the ends and means because once the
United States employs torture, it is likely that such practices would
spread worldwide.  At a minimum, the nation would lose its ability
to condemn torture or other unacceptable acts of cruelty perpe-
trated in other parts of the world.  Even if we could assure the world
that torture would be utilized only in extreme circumstances, any
moral leadership would be destroyed.  Such a situation would be
intolerable.  As Professor Kadish notes:
“Since World War II, progress has been made internation-
ally to mark the perpetrators of [torture as] outlaws
. . . .Any claim by a state that it is free to inflict pain and
suffering upon a person when it finds the circumstances
sufficiently exigent threatens to undermine that painfully
won and still fragile consensus . . . .And if any state is free
of the restraint whenever it is satisfied that the stakes are
high enough to justify it, then the ground gained since
WWII threatens to be lost . . . .Lost would be the opportu-
nity immediately to condemn as outlaw any state engag-
ing in these practices.  Judgment would be a far more
complicated process of assessing the proffered justifica-
tion and delving into all the circumstances.”196
195. Itzak Zamir, Human Rights and National Security, 23 ISR. L. REV. 375, 379-80
(1989).
196. Kadish, supra note 185, at 345.  And this would include at least a decreased
ability to condemn torture as a means of political repression.  After all, those countries
surely could attempt to argue an “ends justify the means” rationale. See Montavon-McK-
illip, supra note 122, at 282 n.122 (“[A]s a world leader, when the United States is
renitent towards international human rights law, it encourages other countries with
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2. Self Defense or Defense of Others
Besides a utilitarian argument — that the end objective of tor-
turing a terrorist justifies the use of torture — an argument for tor-
ture can also be based on the doctrine of self-defense.  After all,
even the seemingly absolute prohibition: “thou shall not kill,” ad-
mits of an exception when the killing is in self-defense or in defense
of others.  The law too, embodies the notion of self-defense as a
justification for inflicting bodily harm.
As every first year law student learns, one is justified in
using deadly force in self-defense only in response to a
threat of death or serious bodily harm, only if the danger
is imminent and immediately forthcoming, and in some
states and in some locations . . .only if there is no available
path of safe retreat.197
So how do such arguments advance the debate over torture?
The answer: if we can kill in defense of self or of others, certainly we
could take action short of that — like torture to obtain critical in-
formation — in defense of others.  Assume a police officer sees two
men with loaded machine guns who begin, indiscriminately, to
shoot hundreds of people in a crowded movie theatre.  No one
would doubt the officer could shoot to kill the men if necessary to
stop the carnage.  Let’s change the hypothetical somewhat.  One
man is headed to a theatre in a city to randomly shoot and kill as
many people as possible, and the police have, in custody, his part-
ner who refuses to reveal where his confederate is heading.
Wouldn’t torture in order to stop the shooting be justified as an
action in defense of others?
Of course, when considering whether to torture a suspect, the
usual conception of self-defense is not operative: captured terrorists
do not pose any imminent threat of deadly force.  Nonetheless, one
197. Susan Estrich, Justifiable Homicide: Battered Women, Self Defense and the Law, 88
MICH L. REV. 1430, 1431 (1990).
In most jurisdictions, there is both perfect and imperfect self-defense.  In perfect
self-defense, the defendant is motivated by an honest belief of danger, and that belief
was objectively reasonable. See People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178, 1186 (4th Dist.
1989).  In imperfect self-defense, the defendant honestly but unreasonably believes
there was imminent threat to life, e.g., Hartman v. Summer, 120 F.3d 157, 161 (9th Cir.
1997), or the defendant is the initial aggressor and the decedent escalates the conflict.
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can make the argument by analogy.  If a terrorist knows the loca-
tion of a hidden bomb, or the plans of a co-conspirator, “he has
culpably caused the situation where someone must get hurt.  If
hurting him is the only means to prevent the death or injury of
others put at risk by his actions, such torture should be permissible,
and on the same basis that self-defense is permissible.”198
In essence, the argument can be made that the same self-de-
fense rationale that led our nation to declare war on al Qaeda
could be employed to justify the use of torture.  To stop the future
threat of terrorism, this country was willing to wage war — a war,
which not only killed those dedicated to harming us, but also, un-
fortunately, maimed and killed thousands of innocent lives in Af-
ghanistan.  If this action were morally justified (and there is no
large groundswell of support that it is not), then why would in-
flicting harm, on the person who intends to cause significant death,
in order to prevent those deaths, be beyond the pale of acceptable
behavior for a state.  Both acts — the act of war and the act of tor-
ture — are undertaken in self-defense.
Concededly, the self-defense argument has some persuasive-
ness.  But the problem with this argument lies in its elasticity.  The
concept of self-defense has traditionally been carefully cabined to a
situation where a defender acts in order to prevent a real and immi-
nent harm, with no viable alternative way to prevent such a harm
from occurring.199  There has been only one situation in which
some courts have permitted stretching the doctrine of self-defense
somewhat, and that is where a person, usually a battered woman,
kills or disables her persistent batterer.200  In those cases, the immi-
nence requirement may be somewhat relaxed, but there still exists a
reasonable and real danger from the batterer to the defender.
That is, even though the battered woman may kill her husband
198. Moore, supra note 17, at 323.
199. See e.g., State v. Norman, 324 N.C. 253, 266 (1989); U.S. v. Peterson, 483 F.2d
1222 (D.C. Cir 1973); State v. Holland, 193 N.C. 713, 718 (1927).
200. See, e.g., Christine Noelle Becker, Clemency for Killers?  Pardoning Battered Women
who Strike Back, 29  Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 297 (1995); Richard Rosen, On Self Defense, Immi-
nence, and Women Who Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 371, n.4 (1993) (discussing
cases which dispense with, or liberalize, imminence requirement); see also Lenore E.
Walker,  Generalizing Justice, Terrifying Love:  Why Battered Women Kill and How Society Re-
sponds, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1384, 1389 n.8 (1990) (book review) (discussing jurisdictions
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while he is sleeping, and thus currently not harming her, the doc-
trine of self-defense is possibly accepted only if she still perceives
that his very existence renders her life in peril and reasonably per-
ceives no other alternatives available.
But torturing a captured suspect because he may have informa-
tion of harmful conduct goes well beyond the battered wives scena-
rio.  The captured suspect himself, poses no possibility of harm at
any time in the future.  There are obvious possible alternatives to
torture that could be used to prevent the harm.  Allowing torture in
this context, based on a self-defense rationale, would be akin to a
person claiming self-defense to the murder of a prisoner locked in
jail for life.
In other words, the argument to self-defense “by analogy” must
fail because the analogy destroys the very notions of the doctrine.201
Once you start “analogizing,” and remove the doctrine from its es-
tablished roots, you are left with a theory that says:  the government
is acting in self-defense whenever it does something necessary to
prevent harm to society.  Such an interpretation would truly turn us
into the type of society lambasted in the recent popular movie, Mi-
nority Report.202  There, government agents capture or kill people
in advance of their committing a crime, based on a prediction by
three reliable truthsayers as to the future. Surely, such preventive
action would be justified under the theory of self-defense described
above.
The point is, that once self-defense is stretched beyond its care-
fully established, narrowly drawn borders, it becomes a doctrine
without bounds.  A self-defense argument could be raised to justify
torturing a drug dealer who distributed contaminated drugs in or-
der to find out where his drugs are headed.  The argument would
justify torturing an innocent child in order to compel information
from his parent.  Torture could be used on someone who likely
knows the name or whereabouts of a serial killer.  The self-defense
rationale, ultimately, would have no limit.  In sum, there is a recog-
201. Cf. Estrich, supra note 197, at 1437 (asking to alter the rules of self defense for
battered women “is a very uncomfortable request — at least for those of use who see in
the rules of self-defense a laudable recognition of the value of human life and a desira-
ble effort to articulate a normative standard which protects even aggressors and wrong-
doers from instant execution and vigilante justice.”).





      04/27/2004   12:08:32
18178_nlr_48-1-2 Sheet No. 134 Side A      04/27/2004   12:08:32
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\48-1-2\NLR404.txt unknown Seq: 61 16-APR-04 10:36
2003] TORTURE 261
nizable difference between killing someone engaged in the act of
murder, and torturing another person to gain information to pre-
vent a murder.  Upholding that difference is crucial.203
B. Torture is Ineffective
Some argue that even if torture could be philosophically justi-
fied, it is ineffective as a means of obtaining truthful information
and therefore, should be condemned.204  Or, the ineffectiveness of
torture is used in conjunction with the moral argument: torture
cannot be morally justified because it does not even achieve its pur-
pose of saving lives.  In constitutional terms, the ineffectiveness of
torture could be seen as minimizing any compelling government
interest to engage in such behavior, and may make the search for
viable alternative methods of “encouraging cooperation” easier.
So, does torture induce the subject to reveal truthful, impor-
tant information?  Torture, many argue, simply does not work in
most cases.  An individual subject to extreme physical and mental
abuse will talk, but what they say will not be reliable.  A person will
say anything in these circumstances, but not necessarily the
truth.205  Even if someone wants to tell the truth, “minds clouded by
pain or drugs, or addled by sleep deprivation, may have trouble
recalling important details.”206
There is a fair amount of support for this argument.  Studies
are replete with examples of false confessions under conditions far
203. Cf. Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident on
Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 11, 27 (1986) (“[T]o harmonize the
principle that killings in self-defense are justified with the principle that human life is
the highest value protected by the law, the range of defensive conduct that will be
justified must be narrowly circumscribed.”).
204. Of course, torture is very effective when used for the sadistic purpose to intimi-
date or terrorize dissidents.  “Torture may also be counterproductive on other grounds:
it may turn some innocent suspects into real terrorists, and turn terrorists into more
determined monsters.”  Peter Maas, Torture: Tough or Lite: If Suspect Won’t Talk, Should it
be Made to?” NEW YORK TIMES, March 9, 2003, § 4 at 4.
205. See Haddock, supra note 3 (research demonstrates that torture often produces
false confessions and phony information because victim reaches point where he will say
anything to make it stop).
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less egregious than torture.207  Even the CIA has come to the con-
clusion that physical abuse usually is ineffective in ferreting out the
truth.208  Similar complaints are lodged against the use of so-called
truth serum:  while a person’s inhibitions might be lessened, there
is no strong evidence that the truth comes forth.209
Even if torture succeeded in coercing a suspect to honestly tell
all he knows, it may still be ineffective in most cases because the
suspect truly may not know much.  As we have learned after Sep-
tember 11, sophisticated terrorist organizations, such as al Qaeda,
operate on a strict “need to know” basis.  There is significant evi-
dence that most of the 19 hijackers did not know in advance, the
details of the plot to hijack and pilot planes into the World Trade
Center, the Pentagon, and presumably the White House.210  Thus,
unless the right person is in custody (which alone may foil the
207. See e.g., Welsh White, What is an Involuntary Confession Now? 50 RUTGERS L. REV.
1002, 1057 n.34 (1998); Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A Leo, The Consequences of False
Confession: Deprivation of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interro-
gation, 88 J.CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998).
208. See Tim Werner, CIA Taught, then Dropped Mental Torture in Latin America, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 29, 1997, at A1.
209. See Wendy Kisch, From the Couch to the Bench: How Should the Legal System Respond
to Recovered Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 5 AM U. J. GENDER & SOC. POL’Y & L., 207,
224-45 (1994) (no medical or scientific basis to believe sodium amytol acts as a real
“truth” serum, citing to various medical studies); see also Robert Mathew, Why Their Ways
of Making You Talk Don’t Include Truth Drugs Under Interrogation, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Nov.
11, 2001, at 41 (while drugs make suspects more chatty, there is no evidence that they
are “chirruping on” about the truth); John McDonald, Truth Serum, POLICE SCIENCE 259,
261 (suspect who is able to withstand competent and prolonged interrogation is argua-
bly able to withstand interrogation under narcosis); Simon Crerar, Giving the Lie to Truth
Drugs, TIME NEWSPAPER, Jan. 6, 2002 (truth serum least likely to work when adminis-
tered in an antagonistic environment).
Because of its unreliability, most courts have rejected a request to admit statements
voluntarily elicited under truth serum. See Anne E Donlan, O’Brien Case Judge Nixes
Truth Serum Test Evidence, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 10, 1997, at 6; see also People v. John-
son, 32 Cal. App. 3d 988, 1001 (4th Dist. 1977) (no Supreme Court nor lower court of
this state has admitted truth serum tests for truth of matter stated due to lack of scien-
tific evidence as to reliability); accord, State v. Linn, 93 Idaho 430 (1969). But see United
States v. Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522 (9th Cir. 1985) (no error in admitting witness testi-
mony enhanced through use of narcoanalysis). See generally Steven Friedland, Law Sci-
ence and Malingering, 30 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 337, 364-65 (1998) (though courts reluctant to
receive testimony under “truth serum,” some courts have admitted it in limited
circumstances).
210. The best evidence is from the horse’s mouth, so to speak: bin Laden, on video-
tape, laughed about the fact that many of the hijackers did not realize their fate in
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plot), torturing most confederates might not yield valuable infor-
mation even if the person honestly relays what he knows.
But torture need not always be effective to be justified.  First, it
is important to remember that torture is not being advocated for
purposes of obtaining evidence to prosecute someone.  In that case,
the reliability of information would be paramount.  But here, the
information is being sought in order to further investigate and to
try to prevent future terrorist attacks.  While, undoubtedly, there is
ample evidence that torture frequently yields false confessions, this
concern is less significant when the purpose of an interrogation is
to obtain information and not to secure a conviction.211  When tor-
ture is utilized for informational purposes only, the dangers of false
information are the risks of wasted time and resources.  The possi-
bility of even a germ of truth coming from the mouth of an other-
wise silent conspirator, conceivably, might be worth the risk.
Thus, evaluating the efficacy of torture requires information
not currently available and perhaps, unknowable.  There are times
when torture has worked in the past, and there undoubtedly would
be successes in the future.212  So the question becomes an empirical
211. Cf. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (distinguishing between necessary
effectiveness when hypnosis is used for investigation versus prosecutorial purposes).
212. For example, Jordan broke the famous terrorist Abu Nidel by threatening his
family.  The Philippines reportedly cracked the 1993 World Trade Center bombings by
convincing a suspect that they would turn him over to the Israelis.  Jonathon Alter, Time
to Think about Torture, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 5, 2001, at 48; see also Scott Martelle, The Truth
about Truth Serum, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2001, at E4 (Ronald Katz, an anesthesiologist
professor at USC and UCLA who has used sodium pentathol in thousands of patients
says that in his experience, less than 50% of his patients answer honestly under the
influence of the drug.).  Even if only 40% of those tortured accurately “spilled the
beans,” that might justify the use of “truth serum.”  In 1995, the Philippine state police
turned the testicles, and broke the ribs of one al Qaeda agent who, after two weeks, was
broken and revealed a plot to hijack 11 airplanes.  Jack Wheeler, Interrogating KSM:
How to Make the Al Qaeda Terrorist Sing in an Hour, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, March 5,
2003, at A19.
Professor Feller explains why torture, or the threat of torture may work: “The
whole secret to the effectiveness of pressure — of whatever kind, including physical
pressure — is that the suspect never know what comes next.  Then, as he does not know
whether he will be unable to bear up under the next level, he decides that rather than
break then, it may be worthwhile to surrender in advance and save himself unnecessary
suffering that he will, in any event be unable to withstand.  If the suspect knows from
the start that the interrogator is unable to deviate from a moderate measure of pressure
. . . information that the terrorist organizations will no doubt disseminate with all due
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one:  how often would truthful information be obtained versus how
often false information would be provided to set back an investiga-
tion and make it less likely that a criminal plot would be uncovered?
After all, false information is only harmful if it has such conse-
quences because the information is never utilized for prosecution.
It would need to be determined, for example, whether forsaking
torture but utilizing other techniques such as bribes or incentives,
or acceptable, psychological strategies,213 would be more effec-
tive.214  Determination of whether false leads create such a diver-
sion that the police efforts are actually hampered, would be
necessary.
Until these questions are answered, there is no way to accu-
rately assess the effectiveness of torture in those rare situations
when it might be utilized in the war on terrorism.  But the burden
on those arguing that torture is too ineffective to utilize would be
heavy.  Even if nine times out of ten, a tortured suspect would
falsely confess to a crime, or lie to stop being tortured, if the one
time truth prevails is the situation where the terrorist has hidden a
nuclear bomb in a major city, torture could arguably be seen as
effective.  Or to put it differently, even a 10% chance of success
measure of physical pressure [is reached].”  S.Z. Feller, Not Actual ‘Necessity’ But Possible
Justification; Not “Moderate” Pressure, but Neither “Unlimited” or “None at All,” 23 ISR. L. REV.
201, 211 (1989).
213. See, e.g., War on Terrorism:  Mission Impossible, CNN Transcripts, November 24,
2002, available at CNN.Com at 5 (copy on file with author) (quoting an expert interro-
gator as saying  “you’d be amazed at what a kind word and a cup of hot cocoa on a
fifteen degree night would do. . . even the highest ranking al Qaeda started crying
before anything was said to him.”  The expert concluded that even without torture,
some interrogations succeed because many suspects, coming from nations which in-
dulge in torture, assume torture would be used.).
214. Of course, it can be presumed that the police would start with other incentives
besides physical coercion to obtain cooperation.  Promising leniency, or safety for the
suspect’s family, or other such incentives has been successful in the past.  For example,
the offer of reduced sentences worked for Ahmed Ressen, arrested in 1999 for bringing
explosives into the United States for the planned bombing of Los Angeles International
Airport during the millennium, and for Ali Mohamed, who pled guilty to the 1997
bombing of the U.S. embassy in Kenya and provided valuable information on al Qaeda.
Haddad, supra note 4, at D.1
Some unknown successful interrogation tactic, presumably not torture, has been
making Zubaydah, an al Qaeda “higher up,” talk, and provide useful information.  Rich-
ard Serrano, U.S. Breaks Old Legal Ground, L.A. TIMES, November 25, 2002 at A1, A16
(Zubaydah gave FBI information to capture Padilla, who is accused of plotting to plant
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might make torture “effective” given the lack of any viable
alternative.
C. The Slippery Slope Argument:  Can the Use of Torture be Confined?
Even if torture is as morally justified as self-defense in narrow
circumstances, and even if torture is possibly effective, a final argu-
ment is raised against permitting any use of torture: there is no con-
venient stopping point.  As previously discussed, the post
September 11th debate over torture involves a very narrow issue.
Virtually no one seriously advocates the wholesale use of torture.
But some suggest that it would be naı̈ve to reject torture, outright,
for all possible scenarios.  Even the self-defense argument usually
focuses on the use of torture in one seemingly narrow circum-
stance.  For example, Alan Dershowitz sets the stage this way:  “a
captured terrorist knows the location of ticking bomb that threat-
ens hundreds of innocent lives; the only way to prevent the mass
murder is to torture the terrorist into disclosing the bomb’s loca-
tion; there is no time for reflection; a decision must be made.”215
In this situation, and this situation only, torture is reluctantly
sanctioned.
On first glance, many people might concur that torture is ap-
propriate in this one, narrow, and hopefully never-to-happen scena-
rio.  Accepting the use of torture only in this one factual setting,
however, assumes that torture can be limited to such a circum-
stance.  But there are obvious problems in even defining this situa-
tion — much less limiting the use of torture to this situation.
Numerous questions arise that make it impossible to even de-
termine the exact scenario Dershowitz imagines.  First, how certain
should we be that the terrorist knows the location of the bomb?
How certain should we be that there is a bomb?  Criminal law
speaks of different levels of certainty, ranging from reasonable sus-
picion, a minimal standard used to justify a brief stop of an individ-
ual,216 to probable cause, the standard necessary to arrest a person,
215. Alan M Dershowitz, Is it Necessary to Apply “Physical Pressure” to Terrorist — and to
Lie About It?, 23 ISR. L. REV.192 (1989).
216. Reasonable suspicion exists when police officers are able to articulate some
minimum level of subjective justification for stopping a person.  It must be more than
an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch,” but less than probable cause.
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or to search a person’s possessions,217to beyond a reasonable
doubt, necessary to convict an individual of a crime.218  What level
of suspicion is necessary before torture is undertaken?  For exam-
ple, there is certainly a reasonable possibility that Abu Zabaydah, a
top lieutenant to Osama bin Ladin, might have information about
future terrorist attacks.  Is that possibility about some amorphous
future event that might involve loss of life, enough to fit within the
ticking bomb scenario?
Moreover, how many lives need be on the line before the “tick-
ing bomb” scenario comes into play?  What if the danger is to ten
lives?  Is that enough?  And need it literally be a bomb?  It makes no
sense to view the “ticking bomb” literally.  For example, if a suspect
knew about the planned release of smallpox as a weapon, the same
justifications for torture would apply.219  So, what if the danger is
from a sniper or a kidnapper — is one child hidden away sufficient
to justify the use of torture?220  And of course, this brings us out of
the realm of terrorism and into the world of “traditional crimes.”  If
torture can be utilized to save ten lives from a bomb, why not allow
217. Probable cause exists when there is a fair probability that contraband or evi-
dence of a crime will be found, or, for purposes of an arrest, that the person arrested
committed the crime. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); C.M.A. Mc-
Cauliff, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantee?  35
VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1325 (discussing difference between probable cause and reasonable
suspicion).
218. The “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard is a due process requirement that a
trial judge must instruct a jury in a criminal proceeding to support a conviction.  Victor
v. Nebraska, 511 U.S., 1 (1994); In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).  It is defined
as proof that satisfies the fact-finder to a near certitude of the guilt of the accused.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979) (beyond a reasonable doubt plays a vital
role in implementing the presumption of innocence; it impresses upon the fact-finder
“the need to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused. . ..”);
see also, Note, Reversal of Fortunato: Textualism Un-Dunn in State v. Dunn, 3 ROGER WIL-
LIAMS U. L. REV. 253, 317 (1998).
219. Of course, once the “bomb” aspect of the equation need not be viewed liter-
ally, the exigency component — “ticking” need not as well.
220. The natural tendency to expand the nature of exigencies is evident in the
controversy over “questioning outside Miranda.”  For example, in investigating a home-
less man for the murder of young girl, the police officers said they “put aside our nor-
mal standard procedure for the greater good of possibly finding the bodies of the
young girl and other missing persons.”  Klein, supra note 131, at 457-58.  “Apparently,
these officers determined that the greater good necessitated ignoring Clark’s more
than 100 requests for an attorney during the interrogation, and threatening Clark with
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it to be used to save the lives of five children hidden by a crazed
neighbor?  Or why not sanction torture to reveal the name of a
madman who has killed a random, innocent person almost every
day for a few weeks and shows no sign of stopping?221
Even if we could determine the number of lives at risk that
justifies the use of torture, and the level of certainty that a crime has
occurred or is about to occur, and that the suspect in custody has
critical information, how do we assess the level of exigency and the
inability to obtain the information through traditional means?
Must the bomb literally be ticking — what if the information per-
tains to a plot to plant a bomb within the month?  A week?222  Of
course, the longer the time period, the greater the chance that
traditional methods of law enforcement will detect the plot.  But
where do we draw the line?  And how do we decide that methods
besides torture will not work in time?223
The point is simply this: no matter how one tries to confine the
use of torture to extreme, narrow circumstances, the temptation to
broaden those circumstances is inevitable.224  Without an absolute
prohibition on the use of torture, it is virtually impossible to ensure
that “special cases” remain special.  Once torture is a weapon in an
officer’s arsenal, once the social unacceptability of utilizing torture
breaks down, the practice will be legitimized.  “The legitimization
of repugnant practices in special cases inevitably loosens antipathy
to them in all cases.”225  As Professor Kadish so eloquently con-
221. This is borrowed from the story of the “D.C. Sniper,” who “terrorized” the
Washington D.C. area between October 2 and October 22. See, e.g., Donna Leinwand
and Jack Kelley, New Killing, Sniper’s Threat Add Urgency to Manhunt, USA TODAY, Oct. 23,
2002, at A1.  Of course, it also reveals the difficulty at time differentiating between
“crime” and “terrorism.”
222. See, e.g., Kremnitzer, supra note 188, at 253 (Landau  Commission states that it
may be justifiable to employ actual torture to discover a bomb about to go off in a
crowded building, and that there is no significant difference between a bomb set to
explode in five minutes and one set to detonate in five days).
223. One recent example that comes to mind in this regard involves the arrest of 3
American medical students of Middle Eastern descent appearance in Florida.  Their car
was stopped after a woman at a diner where they had eaten earlier claimed she over-
heard them talking about a future attack.  All three were later exonerated.  If torture
were allowed in ticking bomb cases, wouldn’t it possibly likely be used here? See Alexan-
der Glassbrook, Would Torture Ever be Legal in the UK? THE TIMES, March 25, 2003.
224. See Steve Chapman, Should we Use Torture to Stop Terrorism?, CHI. TRIBUNE, Nov.
1, 2001, at 31.
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cludes, “when torture is no longer unthinkable, it will be thought
about.”226
IV. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER
Thus far, what I have attempted to argue is this:  Torturing a
terrorist suspect in the “ticking bomb” scenario — or any other situ-
ation — would clearly violate the Constitution if any resulting state-
ment is used against the suspect in a court of law.  If the
information is never used against a suspect in a criminal case, how-
ever, it might not violate the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.
The most credible constitutional argument against torture in such a
circumstance would be that it infringes upon an individual’s sub-
stantive due process rights.  But even the most egregious physical
abuse may not violate the Constitution.  Finding a substantive due
process violation would ultimately require balancing the intrusion
on the individual against any compelling government interest in
torturing.  It is possible, therefore, that no constitutional violation
would be found if the circumstances surrounding the use of torture
were sufficiently compelling.
Nonetheless, I argue that the use of torture should be viewed
as presumptively unconstitutional, and even if not, a prohibited pol-
icy for the United States.  Torture is presumptively unconstitutional
because rarely would there be a compelling government interest
that outweighs the harms of torture.  Why is this so?  First, any com-
pelling government interest in engaging in torture must be dis-
counted by the ineffectiveness of torture, and the availability of
successful alternative methods of interrogation and investigation.  If
torture rarely achieves its goals, and there are other, less harmful
means of obtaining information, even a seemingly compelling in-
terest may not justify torture.
Second, the compelling government interest should not only
include the possibility of saving lives if certain information is ob-
tained from torture.  Rather, any evaluation of the government in-
terest must also consider the harm that would inure to society if it
were it to endorse and engage in, torture.  Specifically, the inability
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fight against terrorism and in its fight against torture and human
rights abuses around the world must be part of the calculus as well.
Permitting torture here, even in exceptional circumstances, makes
it more likely that torture will gain prevalence elsewhere in all cir-
cumstances.  Moreover, the government has an interest in prevent-
ing the inherent banality of its agent’s deliberately inflicting pain
and suffering on a person in order to coerce information.  Accord-
ingly, for the foregoing reasons, the United States should abso-
lutely, and without condition, condemn the use of torture in
interrogation, even if the behavior would somehow comport with
due process.227
Does this truly mean that I would condemn the torture of sus-
pects in all circumstances, without exception?  Consider a hypothet-
ical that gives me nightmares.  The police in New York have, in
custody, a suspect known to be a terrorist.  He is adjudged perfectly
lucid and rational.  He admits to planting a nuclear weapon in the
heart of the city and informs that police that the bomb will go off
227. Another alternative that has been suggested recently is that, rather than have
the United States engage in torture, it should send the recalcitrant prisoner to a coun-
try where torture is practiced.  Or, it merely need threaten to send the person — that
may be enough to ensure cooperation.  Would the Constitution be violated in either
circumstance?  It’s likely that in either case, any information obtained cannot be used at
trial against the person in the United States. See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d.
267 (2d Cir. 1974) (constitutional fundamental protections, like the Fifth Amendment,
apply even to foreign nationals abroad).  A person tortured in a country where the
United States does not exercise de facto political control, and who is not brought to
trial in the United States, however, has no claim for constitutional protection. See
Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596 (D.C. Cir 2000).
Although sending a prisoner abroad in extreme circumstances might create less
harm to our nation than permitting torture here would, the implicit endorsement of
torture such an action entails would raise serious human rights concerns.  Moreover, in
the true emergency — the only situation that should permit such an option to be con-
sidered — it likely would not work.  If there is sufficient time to send a prisoner to a
foreign country and permit interrogation to begin there, there probably is not a true
“ticking” bomb.
Interestingly, the torture of a terrorist suspect by foreign nations in order to pro-
vide information to the United States was the opening sequence in a recent popular
television show, “24 Hours” on Fox Television.  A man was tortured in a foreign country
by members of that country; while tortured, the man revealed that a nuclear bomb was
set to explode in Los Angeles that day.  An American representative did not “partici-
pate” in the torture, but waited in an adjacent room to merely “receive” the results.
The television show, which aired October 29, 2002, did not explore any of the ethical
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within five hours.  Other evidence obtained by the police makes the
threat totally credible.  There is no possibility of evacuation and no
possibility of finding the bomb, except by the most amazing stroke
of luck, during this time.  Would I really argue that the state must
refrain from torture in this case?
In part, my answer may turn on the definition of torture.  As
explained earlier, I believe that certain things so easily tossed into
the pot, as methods of torture, should not be.  Thus, for example, I
would have no problem with the use of sodium pentothal adminis-
tered under medical supervision in the above scenario.
But what if the use of “truth serum” does not work.  Time is
running out.  Should the state try electrodes, needles under the
nails, the vomit mask — any method that might make this person
talk?  My answer still must be no.  Why?  Obviously, it is not an easy
resolution.  It is tempting to say that torture is permissible in this
one hypothetical, and this hypothetical situation only.  So why do I
ultimately stand firm?  First, it is my strong belief that this hypothet-
ical, almost certainly, will never happen.  Rather, there would be
some variation to the facts that would make the use of torture less
compelling.  For example, the person in custody does not confess
to planting the bomb, and the evidence against him is less than
absolute.  Or, the person in custody may not have much informa-
tion to share, even if he is part of a terrorist organization, because
the organization operates on a strict “need to know” basis.  Alterna-
tively, if the person in custody is such an important figure in the
terrorist plot that he has all the relevant information, it may be that
the mere detention of that person foils any plans.  Or, the time
period in which the police have to utilize traditional methods of
investigation will be longer than a few hours.  In other words, the
“best-case scenarios” to justify torture, assumes virtually mythic pro-
portions rather than operate as a realistic event.  We should be
loathe to create an exception to a policy of “no torture ever” based
on a situation that almost certainly would not happen, especially
when the harms from torture are most assuredly to occur.
Rather than base an exception around a specific hypothetical,
rules determining when the nation can engage in torture would
need to be devised.  Thus, the government policy must be either an
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circumstances,” or in the “ticking bomb scenario.”  As previously
argued, these “rules” are no rules at all.  No rule can cover every
situation.  What number of anticipated casualties must be counte-
nanced before indulging in torture?  How certain must the evi-
dence against the suspect be?  How much time does the officer
have before the public is jeopardized?  What method of torture
should be used?  What amount of pain inflicted?  No rule can take
into account all the possible variations in these factors.
Any generalized rule that establishes an exception for the use
of torture would, undoubtedly, lead to an expanding role for tor-
ture as officials explore the outer boundaries of the law.228  Torture
would be used on a suspected al Qaeda member who might know of
future attacks.  It would not only be used if a nuclear bomb were
hidden, but in the more likely scenario of a single suicide bomber.
It would be used on the most vulnerable and the least powerful to
protest.  If rules are promulgated permitting torture in a “ticking
bomb scenario,” torture will become the norm rather than the ex-
ception, particularly when dealing with anyone suspected of terror-
ist ties.  Only an absolute ban on torture would prevent the state
from inflicting pain and suffering in those circumstances.
A variation on the ticking bomb scenario has been suggested:
the state may indulge in torture in extreme circumstances, but only
if the judiciary sanctions the use of torture through the issuance of
a “torture warrant.”229  The idea here is that the decision to torture
is not left unscrutinized, or left to the whims of those who might be
most easily swayed by the emotions of the moment.  Rather, the
interrogator’s discretion is checked by the wisdom of a judicial of-
ficer.  Would this requirement for a torture warrant solve any of the
problems discussed above?
I believe that the use of a torture warrant has the same flaws as
does establishing rules permitting torture, and then some.  It too,
would act as an official, government sanction of torture, with all the
228. As Judge Posner argues: “If rules are promulgated permitting torture in de-
fined circumstances, some officials are bound to want to explore the outer bounds of
the rules.  Having been regularized, the practice will become regular.  Better to leave in
place the formal and customary prohibitions, but with the understanding that they will
not be enforced in extreme circumstances.” See Posner, supra note 17.
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resultant costs.  It would also do little to control the use of tor-
ture.230  If officers were insulated from any liability by a warrant,
they may well seek it in questionable cases, cases where they would
not engage in such behavior on their own.  Officers would have
nothing to lose by requesting such a warrant, and there is a signifi-
cant possibility that some judge would grant such a request.  Thus,
were warrants available for torture, government agents may very
well seek them against detainees in Cuba, or at least some of the
captive upper level members of al Qaeda who might have some in-
formation about possible future attacks.  Clearly, these circum-
stances are far removed from the “ticking bomb” scenario
envisioned by Dershowitz and others.
Moreover, a warrant requirement would do little in providing
oversight to the process of torturing.  It is certain, that proceedings
to obtain a warrant would be conducted in secret.231  After all, a
torture warrant would presumably be sought only in extreme cir-
cumstances dictated by national security.  Even now, much of what
happens to the detainees at Camp X-Ray, in Guantanamo Bay, is
shrouded in secrecy.232  Public disclosure of a desire to obtain a
“torture warrant” because of concern that a weapon of mass de-
struction is hidden in a major city, simply, would not happen.  Such
secrecy would “go a long way to dissipating the advantages pro-
posed to be obtained by subjecting cruel treatment to the rule of
law.  Indeed, to the horror of legal brutality would be added the evil
of secret law, secretly applied.”233
Finally, a warrant requirement would do little to cabin the use
of torture since there undoubtedly would be exceptions to such a
requirement.  For example, while warrants are supposed to be the
230. See also comments by Robert Posner, supra note 17, criticizing the idea of a
torture warrant.
231. For example, there currently is a “secret federal court” that approves wiretaps
and searches in terrorism and espionage cases. See e.g., Editorial:  Rights and the New
Reality, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2002, at B10.  Recently, it was revealed that the FBI gave
false information in more than 75 requests for secret warrants in recent years.  Eric
Lichtblau and Josh Meyer, Terror Probe Feuds Revealed by Secret Court, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 23,
2002, at A1.
232. See, e.g., Coalition of Clergy, Lawyers and Professors v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153
(9th Cir. 2002); see also Henry Weinstein, Prisoners May Face Legal “Black Hole,” L.A.
TIMES, December 1, 2002 at A1.
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norm for police officers conducting searches and seizures under
the Fourth Amendment, the courts have carved numerous excep-
tions out of that constitutional requirement.234  One major excep-
tion is for exigency — a warrant need not be sought if there is no
time to obtain one.235  Since much of the argument for torture re-
volves around a “ticking bomb” scenario that, by definition, involves
elements of exigency, any warrant requirement might well be
excused.
In sum, the warrant requirement would do nothing to rectify
the evils of torture, and do little to restrict its use.  Indeed, having a
warrant process established might encourage police officers to seek
the right to torture more often than they would engage in such
behavior on their own.  And, in the current climate of ever-present
national emergency, a judge might very well issue a warrant permit-
ting torture in circumstances that do not begin to resemble a “tick-
ing bomb” scenario.  Put simply, a warrant procedure likely would
be an invitation to the increasing use of torture.
Thus far, I have tried to argue that establishing a rule of “no
torture except in emergencies,” or “no torture, except via a warrant
issued in an emergency” would be undesirable alternatives to an
absolute ban on torture.  Having said all that, here is the case that
really gives me nightmares were the state to recognize an accept-
able role for torture:  The police in New York have, in custody, a
suspect known to be a terrorist.  He is adjudged perfectly lucid and
rational.  He admits to planting a nuclear weapon in the heart of
the city and informs the officers that the bomb will go off within
five hours.  Other evidence obtained by the police makes the threat
totally credible.  There is no possibility of evacuation, no possibility
of finding the bomb, except by the most amazing stroke of luck,
during this time.  The state tortures this suspect — physically muti-
lating him until he is near death, all to no avail.  The suspect is a
fanatic and no amount of pain inflicted upon him will cause him to
thwart his mission.  So, the police turn to the only option they have
available.  They bring into the interrogation room the suspect’s be-
234. The history of the Fourth Amendment is riddled with exceptions to the re-
quirement that officers must get a warrant in order to search.  California v. Acevedo,
500 U.S. 565, 569 (1991).
235. For a discussion of the exigency exception, see Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S.
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loved four-year-old son.  And they start to torture the child.  As they
strip the child naked, the suspect says nothing.  They strike the
child.  The suspect reacts; he is obviously tormented by the treat-
ment of his child.  The police apply electrodes to the child’s geni-
tals.  After the child is shocked several times, the suspect caves and
tells the police the location of the bomb.
This scenario would clearly fit the “ticking bomb” exception.
Arguments that the “ends justify the means,” or defense of others
could easily justify such action.  Yet a nation that intentionally and
brutally harms an innocent child has clearly lost its moral bearings.
The United States must not become such a nation.  The temptation
to forfeit our most precious values is always most pressing in times
of emergency and war.  Yet, it is at precisely those times when it is
most important to maintain our moral compass.  Only an absolute
ban on torture without exception will enable this nation to resist
the impulse to ignore critical core values in favor of an elusive
security.
